Tag Archives: Consciousness

Thoughts of a Solitary Walker IV: Is the World a Machine?

In the previous essay, I addressed the question “Do we live in a material world?” I argued that the existence of matter is a philosophical postulate rather than a scientific observation or theory. Moreover, I explained further that matter, understood as something completely impervious to mind, contradicts the Christian doctrine of creation. In that essay I warned that if we accept materialism, even in its pseudoscientific form…

Matter becomes the enduring substance of the world and effectively takes the place of the sustaining power of God. We can no longer see God doing anything or feel God’s presence. And the loss of a sense of divine presence and activity in the world lies at the origin and growth of modern agnosticism and atheism.

The Machine Metaphor

In this essay, we will explore the companion idea almost always associated with matter, that is, the machine. How shall we explain the movement, change and transformation that occurs within the physical world? For about 2,000 years before the modern scientific revolution Aristotle’s explanations of natural phenomena had been the norm. Aristotle understood all movement through the analogy of a living organism, which is moved by an internal principle, soul. Every living thing possesses a soul that moves it toward its natural end. The cosmos as a whole is moved by a world soul.

A defining mark of early modern science is rejection of Aristotle and the organic metaphor. But if the world does not move, change and transform in the way an organism moves, changes and transforms, how then does it move? The machine provides an alternative metaphor that seventeenth-century scientists appropriated to their ends. A machine possesses no soul or mind, no internal principle of unity; it does not strive toward an end. Its constituent parts relate to each other externally and transfer movement by physical contact. Having no internal consciousness or hidden purposes, machines are not mysterious and can readily be understood mathematically. And perhaps—I am speculating here—the desire for simplicity and clarity is the reason Galileo, Descartes, and Gassendi were attracted to the machine metaphor. As I argued in “Thoughts of a Solitary Walker II,” excluding from science everything that cannot be measured in mathematical terms—psychological, aesthetic, moral and causal qualities—makes it clear, simple, and comprehensible.

Machines All the Way Down?

A machine is made of components. Understanding a machine scientifically—a mechanical watch, for example—requires differentiating the components from each other and discovering how they relate to one another and in what order and measuring their movements in mathematical terms. But machines in the microworld are composed of components that are themselves composed of components. But how do we know that the mechanical/mathematical model of explanation explains the movement of all physical things? Perhaps in the hidden world, beyond the reach of empirical experience, there is a psychic/spiritual reality at work that manifests itself in our macro world as machine-like behavior? (Think of how our own minds manifest themselves in the movements of our bodies. Indeed, common sense finds it implausible to think of any animal as a machine.) If we cannot rule this out, we cannot know that our mathematical formulae impart real knowledge of nature.

The Buck Stops with Atoms and Corpuscles

Early modern scientists were aware that we cannot prove that the mechanical model applies to every dimension of the physical world. Hence along with the postulate of the existence of matter as the substance of the physical world, they postulated the existence of tiny parts they called atoms or corpuscles. The Greek word “atom” means uncuttable or indivisible. The existence of atoms was first postulated by presocratic philosophers in approximately 500 B.C. Pierre Gassendi and Robert Boyle used the word corpuscle, a word derived from Latin that means “little body.” Though functioning like atoms, they are not necessarily indivisible.*

The postulate of the existence of atoms or highly stable corpuscles allowed the new mechanical/mathematical science to assume as a working hypothesis that all movement and change of any kind in the physical world conforms to the model of mechanical interaction of material components.

To Summarize

The postulate of the existence of matter exorcised all inner psychic factors from the physical world, and the postulate of the existence of atoms or corpuscles justified applying the mechanical model to all movement in the physical world.*

A Working Hypothesis Becomes Metaphysical Truth

As I have emphasized throughout this essay and the previous one, these two postulates were unprovable working hypotheses made to guide research and scientific explanation. Even as working hypotheses I doubt that they are completely innocent of metaphysical hubris. However, it is very tempting to conclude that their success in giving satisfactory explanations of physical movement and change warrants treating them as true representations of metaphysical reality. Many people followed this path into practical or theoretical deism, agnosticism, or atheism, each of which is devoid of the sense of divine presence in the world.

Misplaced Realism Again

The methods used by empirical/mathematical science of the 17th or the 21st century cannot prove—or even provide evidence for—a metaphysical hypothesis, whether material/mechanical or psychic/organic. It cannot distinguish between appearances caused by material atoms interacting externally and mechanically or those caused by internal psychic powers striving to achieve ends. A decision between these two opposing views must be made on other bases. For my part, I believe modern culture has been unwarrantedly and thoughtlessly confident in the material/mechanical hypothesis. So many impressive phenomena of nature and human experience are discounted by this hypothesis. It’s time to rediscover and reconsider the undeniable mental and psychic dimensions of the world. And in doing so we may very well recover a sense of God’s presence and activity all around and within us.

*I have simplified a very complex topic conceptually and historically. Hopefully, I have not falsified it. See the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for greater nuance. Search for “atomism” and other relevant terms.

Thoughts of a Solitary Walker II: Is Science Really Omnicompetent?

In this second installment of this series, I will share some thoughts from my most recent walk.

As my frequent readers know, I have been thinking, writing and reading for many years in search of an answer to the question, “Why do modern people find it tempting to live as if God does not exist?” Another way to put it is: “Why does God seem absent from modern the world?” It wasn’t always true. Before 1500, God seemed very present and active in the world and in the human soul and mind. But something happened between 1600 and the present to change that. What was it? What was lost and what was gained by the changes? And can we recover that sense of “in him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28)?

In other places, I have argued that the modern scientific revolution lies at the root of this change in perception. It was not the empirical, observational, and mathematical aspects of modern science that cause the problem; it was a mistaken realism that refused to recognize the limits of empirical science. That is to say, the models that guided the new natural science—the machine and the material particle—were treated as if they described what is truly real, the basic building blocks of the world.

Modern science developed in conscious opposition to Aristotle’s theories. Aristotle proposed organic, teleological, and metaphysical explanations for natural phenomena. Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi, and other pioneers of modern science rejected Aristotle’s organic model and replaced it with a mechanical one in which material corpuscles (or atoms) interacted through contact in a way that could be described mathematically. Modern science has been spectacularly successful in disclosing and describing the empirical phenomena of nature in mathematical terms. And it has used these discoveries to create technologies that have revolutionized the way we live.

Modern natural science is so impressive that many people assume—or even proclaim—that it will eventually explain everything: If science can’t explain it, it doesn’t exist. Its methods can answer every legitimate question. Perhaps I will address at length these claims in a future post. Here I can make only a brief refutation of these extraordinary claims.

What does modern natural science do? Answer: it measures empirical phenomena—that is the appearances we receive through our five senses—using simple or sophisticated mathematics. It does not explain why things happen, that is, science cannot translate the concept of causality into mathematical terms. Causality is not a phenomenon that can be measured! Contrary to popular belief, natural science cannot rationalize causality; that is, it cannot explain why the transformations we find in nature are necessary. Consider for example Einstein’s famous formula:

E = MC2

It says in words: “the measure of Energy (in Joules) equals the measure of Mass (in kilograms) times the Velocity of Light (in meters per second) multiplied by itself.” Each of the letters in the formula stands for a number that measures a quantity of something we perceive through the senses, a phenomenon. The equal sign is also a mathematical symbol.

The same is also true of Newton’s second law, which says that force equals mass times acceleration:

F = Ma

One more. This time consider a chemical reaction between sulfuric acid and sodium hydroxide, which yields sodium sulfate and water:

H2SO4 + 2NaOH → 2Na2SO4 + 2H2O

Again, every mark in this chemical equation stands for a mathematical quantity or a mathematical operation. The arrow (→) stands for a mathematical equality and a transformation reaction. It is true that the quantities relate to substances (sulfuric acid, sodium hydroxide, sodium sulfide and water) but those substances are themselves known scientifically only in mathematical terms: atomic weights, number of electrons and protons. Of course, these different substances affect the senses differently…but modern natural science does not consider sense perception of qualities—color, taste, odor, sound, and texture—to be scientific knowledge.

In none of these formulae is causality quantified, that is brought into the sphere of scientific (ie mathematical) knowledge. As David Hume pointed out in the 18th century, causality cannot be perceived empirically and therefore cannot be understood in terms of empirical, mathematical science.

Don’t miss this: modern natural science can say nothing about causality in scientific terms! It cannot get beyond the common sense of the non-scientist. People do not believe anything happens without a cause. Why does everyone believe this? Because nothing makes sense without it! And we know that we act causally in some of our actions. We want to raise our arms and we make it happen. We are the proof that some things act causally.

Here then is my refutation of the omnicompetence of modern, empirical, mathematical science: it can’t explain why anything happens…it can only measure it. But causality (the why) is the glue that holds the universe together and makes sense of it all.

Next Time: Another walk and another thought

God, UFOs and the Standard Argument for Extraterrestrial Life

Given all the interest, hype, and conspiracy about UAPs (formerly UFOs) and the speculations about life elsewhere in the universe, I thought I’d point out something I’ve not heard discussed. Cable news talking heads assert that given the mind-boggling number of galaxies and stars in the universe, there’s a good chance that there are many other planets in the universe capable of supporting life of some kind.

I have no problem with this assertion, because the physics of planet formation is easily understood and we have earth as one instance of this occurrence. But the further assertion that the existence of life on some of these planets is likely or even certain, has me raising my eyebrows in skepticism, at least of this line of reasoning:

The Argument for the High Probability of Extraterrestrial Life

1. The argument begins with the obvious fact that we are here on earth in the universe as observers. Hence life is possible in our universe. And, if the conditions of life are present in other parts of the universe, life is possible there also. Possible!

2. Given the trillions of galaxies and the trillions of stars and planets each galaxy contains, the probability is high that life has come to exist in some of those galaxies.

Analysis and Critique of the Probability Argument

3. However, there are two unstated assumptions in this argument, one negative and the other affirmative. They are:

  • (a) that life on our planet came to exist by a combination of chance and physical law (regularities) uninfluenced by intelligence, freedom, and purpose.
  • And (b) that if the right chemical components and the right conditions obtain, life’s evolution is inevitable.

Only if we accept these two assumptions can the notion of probability be applied to the evolution of life.

4. But if the coming to be of life on earth is the result of intelligence, freedom, and purpose, the notion of probability is meaningless. And if the idea of probability cannot be meaningfully applied to the origin of life on earth, then it does not apply anywhere else in the universe.

5. For free acts of divine creation can be assigned no probability because they do not arise solely from chance and physical law…but from divine intelligence, purpose and freedom, which escape both deterministic law and chaotic chance.

6. Is there life anywhere else in the universe? That depends on God’s choice, and for all we know God’s purpose was fulfilled by creating life only in one place in the universe.

The Imprisoned Mind and the Disengaged Self: How Personal Identity Was Separated from the Created Order

Today’s post is the third in our series examining how the statement, “I am a woman trapped in a man’s body” (Carl R. Trueman, The Rise and Triumph of the Modern Self, p. 19), came to be taken seriously by millions of intelligent people. In previous posts, we examined the differences between pre-modern and the modern ways of experiencing the created order. Before the modern scientific revolution, people experienced the appearances as revelatory of the inner reality of things; they used such concepts as substance, essence, soul, beauty, goodness, purpose, and meaning to designate real qualities of things that could be known by contemplating the appearances. Galileo and other early modern scientists drove a wedge between the appearances and the inner reality of things. Things may appear meaningful, good, beautiful, hot, cold, sweet, loud, etc., but these qualities exist only in the human psyche as caused by—but in no way resembling— material impacts on the senses. The only knowable aspects of the reality of things are those that are mathematically measurable. In other words, the only truths our minds can know about things in themselves are mathematical expressions and equations. All else is mere appearance.

As I read the history of modern philosophy—not being an expert but a well-read non-expert—the new empirical/mathematical/mechanical science set new standards for what counts as genuine knowledge of nature. Indeed, it set a new bar for what it means to know anything. In this way, the scientific revolution set the agenda for all areas of study—political philosophy, moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, theology, history, biblical studies, etc. Every area of study measured itself by the gold standard of mathematics. Because mathematics can be applied to the mechanical aspects of nature there is a tendency to reduce nature to material atoms (or quanta) organized and interacting in a mechanical way.

We see here two of the central challenges the new science posed to philosophy in the seventeenth century: (1) It must develop a new epistemology for the empirical age—what does it mean to know and how can we attain knowledge within the limits of empiricism? (2) It must work out the implications of the new science for all areas of study. For this series, I am interested in philosophical anthropology and theology. How shall we understand the nature and operations of the human mind, if we assume that the entire world outside our minds—including our bodies—is a material machine with which we make contact only through sense perception and can know truly only in mathematical categories?

John Locke and The Imprisoned Mind

Though he wrote at the end of the seventeenth century and many thinkers had already worked on the two challenges mentioned above, John Locke’s book Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1698) proved a watershed in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. Many leading European philosophers for the next century—until Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason—wrote either in support or in opposition to Locke.

I will again quote Locke’s statement about the distinction between primary and secondary qualities:

“These I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. Secondly, such qualities which in truth are nothing in objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colors, sounds, tastes, etc. These I call secondary qualities” (John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1698, II. 8).

Locke’s self-appointed task is to explain how the human mind gains understanding of the external world, given the new science. From where do the mind’s ideas come? Locke rejected the traditional belief that the human mind comes into being furnished with ideas that refer to the external world, morality, and God. Locke asserts, instead, that the mind begins as an empty slate, ready to receive sense impressions from the empirical world through its mechanical causality.

If the mind is an empty slate, as Locke contends, how does it receive, interpret, and organize ideas into the vast system of concepts, categories, memories, and laws that constitute our mental life? What are the native powers of the mind. As far as I can tell—as a well-read non-expert—we are endowed at birth with the passive power of sense perception, an active power of reason, and an instinctive drive toward pleasure and away from pain. The external world possesses primary qualities (powers) that strike our perceptive organs and cause the mind to form simple ideas. For Locke, an “idea” is any intelligible object within the mind. As a reasoning power the mind associates compatible simple ideas to form more complex ideas and so builds up our conceptual world. Notice that it is not already existing ideas, forms, and essences that are communicated from external things by means of the senses to the mind. Locke is agnostic about the existence of such things. External things contact the senses only as mechanical/material impacts. In a way Locke never explains, the mind receives these physical impacts and the physical changes they make to our sense organs as intelligible ideas.

Locke’s Disengagement of the Self from Its Body and Soul

As I said above, Locke is agnostic if not skeptical about the existence of forms, substances, and essences. In any case, we cannot attain scientific knowledge of them. We gain all knowledge from the senses as I described above. Locke applies the same empirical limits to the human person. Our knowledge of ourselves and our minds must also come—at least indirectly—from the senses and the ideas impressed on our minds through them. What is a person, and what is personal identity? How do you know that you are the same person you were five years ago? Previous thinkers argued that persistence of personhood (or continuity of personal identity) presupposes the existence of the immaterial, substantial soul. But Locke contends that we cannot experience the substantial, immaterial soul so as to be able to use it as a guarantee of persistent identity.  Hence Locke disengaged the two and made personhood a matter of continuity of consciousness, which we can experience as an activity of mind in awareness of its ideas as its own. I am the same person because I am conscious of being the same self. Consciousness, not substance, constitutes the self. Consciousness (the self) is not a substance. To illustrate, he imagines the same self (a person) inhabiting different bodies and different souls at different times and finds no contradiction. On Locke’s premises one can imagine a person, that is, a consciousness of being oneself, inhabiting a male body/soul at one time and a female body/soul at another—though to my knowledge Locke did not conduct this thought experiment.

Takeaways

1. John Locke applied the methods and assumptions of the new mechanical/empirical science to the human mind and its workings. He rejects the belief that the human mind possesses inborn ideas, forms, or any information in common with the external world or that it receives such information from outside the mind by way of our senses. Our minds construct the world we know out of simple ideas created by mechanical impacts on our sense organs. Creation is thus silenced.

2. It would be too much to say that John Locke invented the modern self. But he disengaged the personal identity (the self) from both body and soul. The self or person refers not to the human as a biological being or to the soul understood as a metaphysical substance or form but to our consciousness of being the same self through time.

3. Locke’s view of personal identity is not exactly the same as such modern concepts as intersectionality or gender identity. However, these modern views presuppose something like Locke’s disengagement of the self from the human body and soul. Perhaps the modern assertion “I am a woman trapped in a man’s body” could not have occurred to Locke as a possible combination of ideas because of the biological meaning of the word “woman.” On a biological level male and female are incompatible. However, if by “woman” one means “consciousness of possessing qualities usually associated with persons inhabiting female bodies” Locke’s definition of person/self would seem to allow its possibility. Possessing a male or female body could not be taken as a revelation of one’s created identity. Indeed, I am not sure Locke’s view of the person could accommodate the concept of a given or created identity communicated to us, for example, by means of the appearance of the human body or its reproductive function.

Next Time: Background to the progressive/liberal view of the authority of Scripture for Christian faith and life.

Thinking and Thoughtfulness: Part 3 Introspection

Introspection

Introspection is also an important operation of reason and a necessary prelude to thoughtfulness. It attempts to look within our inner consciousness to see it apart from our relationship to external objects. Introspection works to isolate, observe and relate distinct feelings, moods, memories, ideas and values in the mind or soul. Perhaps Augustine’s Confessions does not conform exactly to my definition of introspection–which I admit is rather radical and “pure”–but it does provide an excellent example of the inward-turned eye that sorts and sifts motive from motive and feeling from feeling seeking deeper self-knowledge. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Reveries of a Solitary Walker, though narcissistic and dripping with self-pity, also displays an astounding inward awareness that is quite instructive about what we can learn from introspection.

Without introspection our consciousness would be engulfed by wave after wave of sensation or lost in abstractions of thought. Socrates’ observation that “the unexamined life is not worth living” comes to mind here. Apart from some introspection there is no self-knowledge and without self-knowledge we could not distinguish between the life we freely enact and events that merely happen in, to or through us.

Notice how introspection relates to common sense and scientific thought.  In distinction from common sense, introspection isolates the self from external relations by ignoring the external causes of internal experience. In analogy to science, it treats relations within the self like science treats relations among things external to the self. It wants to see its feelings and moods, beliefs and ideas and their interrelationships undistorted by their external relations. Whereas science wants to escape the distorting influence of internal subjectivity on our knowledge of external things, introspection wants to escape the clouding influence of external things on awareness of our internal condition. If science risks self-deception by ignoring the influence of the subjective on our knowledge of the external world, introspection risks self-deception by thinking it can isolate our internal subjectivity from the external world.

Introspection alone cannot lead to complete self-understanding because the self exists only in relation to the not-self, to the external world of people, nature and things. Nonetheless, introspection is valuable because we cannot think everything at once. We cannot think about the self in itself and its relation to external objects and the characteristics of the objects in themselves in one thought at one time. To achieve greater understanding we must move back and forth between part and whole, inside and outside, self and other to grasp all dimensions of something…even if that something is us.

To be continued…

Next time we will think about thoughtfulness itself…I promise.