Monthly Archives: January 2022

Who Speaks for Christianity on Moral Issues? Series Conclusion

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For some time now, I have been pursuing the question of the proper use of the Bible in Christian ethics, using the issue of same-sex relationships as a test case. This essay is the tenth in this series, which is a sub-series within a larger 35-essay series on Christianity and the contemporary moral crisis that began July 01, 2021. Though there is much more to be said, it is now time for me to end this series by stating in a positive way my view of the proper way to use scripture to address this issue.

The Question of Teaching Authority

Investigation into the proper “use” of scripture in Christian theology and ethics presupposes someone or some group that “uses” it. Who is that? Are we speaking about individual believers, exegetes, and theologians? Or, are we speaking about churches and denominations? Individuals are free to “use” scripture according to their understanding to construct their personal theological and ethical systems. But the opinions of individuals possess no authority for others. No Christian is obligated to accept an individual’s opinion as binding Christian doctrine. The discussion about same-sex unions is ultimately about what the church should teach and what moral behaviors the church should promote, accept, or condemn for its members. In contemporary society a person is legally free to have sex with whomever they please as long as there is mutual consent. In these essays I am not discussing sexual ethics for contemporary society. I am discussing whether or not the church should affirm those who claim to be Christians and wish to participate in the life of the church while also living in a same-sex sexual relationship. How should the church use scripture in its deliberations?

It is not enough for exegetes to opine on what the scriptures say about same-sex relationships. The church has to decide what it should say to itself and the world about this matter in obedience to scripture. The church may wish to hear the opinions of individual exegetes, historians, and theologians as part of its deliberations. But no matter how ingenious or sophisticated they may be, these proposals possess no doctrinal or ecclesiastical authority. The church as a community must decide in the spirit of obedience whether or not it should affirm same-sex unions as morally acceptable Christian behavior within that community.

Christian denominations often acknowledge areas where diverse private opinions on theology are allowed and different areas where private choices of ways of life are permitted. But nearly all Christian denominations hold adherence to some doctrines necessary and anyone who teaches a different doctrine is deemed a heretic. The recalcitrant person may be stripped of their office and excluded from teaching within the church. Likewise, anyone guilty of behaviors deemed by the denomination as immoral is subject to discipline and perhaps excommunication. And a person who rejects the church’s moral teaching and teaches others to do the same may be subject to excommunication.

The Weight of Tradition

A church’s official doctrine and moral teaching are the result of long-term communal experience and reflection on scripture, perhaps reaching all the way back to the apostles. Whereas most churches do not hold their confessions of faith to be infallible and irreformable, they are, nevertheless, slow to accept proposals for radical change. There is much to consider, too much for any one individual to grasp and too important to rush the process. On the matter of the moral status of same-sex unions, it would be difficult to find a moral or doctrinal teaching on which there is a greater and longer-term consensus within the world-wide church. The church is right to be skeptical of proposals that interpret the scriptures in ways radically different from the way it has understood them for 2,000 years. As I demonstrated in my reviews of works by Karen Keen and Robert Gnuse, critics of the tradition can achieve no more than opening a mere possibility that the Bible does not condemn loving, non-coercive homosexual relationships along with its clear condemnation of exploitive same-sex intercourse. Gnuse admits that Paul probably would have condemned even non-coercive same-sex relationships, if he had been asked about them. The leap from these meager, tentative, and speculative exegetical results to affirmation of same-sex unions as morally equal to traditional marriage is huge and completely unwarranted. It seems to me that those who make this giant leap do so for reasons other than desire to obey scripture and use their exegetical gymnastics as a diversion to distract readers from the real reasons for their decision.

Church Decision Making

How does the church make decisions on doctrine and morals? The first thing on which to get clear is that the Christian church does not claim the freedom to create doctrine and moral law arbitrarily or to change it to fit the spirit of the age. Faithful churches acknowledge that they are charged with passing on the faith as they received it from Christ and his apostles. For my part, I will not acknowledge any institution as the church that will not make this confession or that I sense does not make it sincerely. Hence the church’s decision-making process should focus on remaining faithful to the original gospel and moral vision in our present circumstances. I am suspicious of any church that seems to allow other concerns to divert it from this task. Churches, too, can be carried away by grave error and even become heretical.

The second thing to keep in mind is that the decision-making process of the church cannot be made completely formal and procedural. For example, it cannot be carried out through the mechanisms of direct democracy wherein a majority of the living members can legislate for the whole body. Nor is the church a representative democracy. It is certainly not a dictatorship. The goal is not to canvass the will of the people but to discern the will of God and seek God’s guidance on how best to remain faithful in the present age. On matters that a church—a local congregation, a denomination, or the ecumenical church—confesses and teaches to itself and the world, the community as a whole must come to consensus on the issue, and this may take a long time. And the process of coming to consensus may take place quite informally. And of course on most doctrinal and moral issues the present consensus was achieved centuries ago and reaffirmed by many succeeding generations of believers.

With respect to the challenge of those who argue that the church should affirm same-sex unions on the same basis as it affirms traditional marriage, what factors should the church consider? If it is determined to remain faithful, the church must continue to read scripture as the standard of its faith and morals. Because it is open to deepening its understanding of God’s will, the church will not refuse to listen to voices that propose new interpretations of scripture. But the church did not begin to read and interpret scripture yesterday. Hence it listens to those new interpretations only in light of what it has been taught by tradition. Tradition embodies the long-term, time-tested wisdom of the faithful about the meaning of the scriptures, and a church that desires to be faithful will not discard it lightly. The burden of proof will always fall on those who challenge the wisdom of tradition. Moreover, the church will exercise discernment about whether or not these new voices speak with sincere desire to seek the will of God or speak deceptively. Both Jesus and the beloved disciple tell us not to be naïve about new teachings:

“Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. By their fruits you will recognize them” (Matthew 7:15-16). “Dear friends, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world” (1 John 4:1).

My Final Word

I cannot speak for the whole church or any particular congregation or denomination, and I possess no authority to obligate anyone to obedience. However, I urge believers individually and the church corporately not to be deceived by sophisticated arguments that, contrary to the unanimous Christian tradition and against the grain of reason, claim that scripture does not condemn and perhaps even approves of same-sex unions. I believe these arguments possess moving force only for those already persuaded by the spirit of the age, which elevates the authority of a subjective sense of identity and well-being above reason, moral law, traditional wisdom, and scriptural teaching.

Academic Freedom in Context

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Introduction

I wrote this document to clarify my ideas on matters being discussed in the college where I teach. Your observations on how I could improve it are welcome.

Human Freedom—Conceptual and Practical

Freedom is primarily a negative concept. It names the absence of a determining, coercive, or deceptive force that channels human action to a particular end.

The concept of freedom does not contain within itself any evaluation of the ends toward which human action is obligated or desires to move. In other words, the bare concept of freedom contains no information about what is right or good. Freedom is of value only as a means to right or good ends. And freedom is of value to a particular individual only as a means to ends that that individual desires or feels obligated to seek. Hence freedom cannot serve as an end in itself; it is not a freestanding value.

Freedom is openness for action or inaction with other ends in mind. Freedom is meaningless (that is, without purpose as a means) unless the action it permits is directed by compelling ends. But to direct an action to an end is simultaneously to negate other possible actions. Hence freedom cannot be a means to any particular end apart from limits that exclude other possible ends. Interestingly, then, freedom, that is, unlimited openness for any logically and physically possible action, is useless (as a means) apart from limits!

Does the concept of limit, then, contradict the concept of freedom? Of course, unlimited freedom cannot coexist with limits. But we must remember that freedom is not an end in itself. It is a good only insofar as it enables an agent to act toward a good or right end. And freedom is a good to a particular agent only as it provides the conditions under which that agent is enabled to work toward an end that seems good or right to them. Hence an agent’s decision to limit its action to achieve particular good and right ends does not contradict the concept of freedom-as-a-means; it contradicts only the concept of freedom-as-an-end-in-itself.

Human Freedom in Community

As we concluded above, even considered solely as individuals—at least in a world like ours in which not all actions are good or right—to be a value freedom must be limited by the directing power of worthy ends. But we also live in a world with other agents. And other individuals have differing conceptions of good and right and of what ends to seek. Hence arises the possibility of another type of limit on freedom. When conceived as the freedom of multiple particular agents acting simultaneously, freedom may even contradict and limit itself; because the space in which these agents act overlaps. A new problem then arises: how may we harmonize the freedom of many individuals. Perhaps we could dream of a utopia where the desires and consciences of everyone are in complete harmony and everyone could pursue their desires without being limited by others’ pursuit of theirs. But that is not the world we live in. In the world in which we live the freedom of an individual is limited not only by the ends we seek and limits we impose on ourselves but by the freedom of others to do the same.

To live in our world we must live in community, that is, in some mode of harmony achieved by coming to a common understanding of the good and right ends to which freedom is a means. Through long-term experience we learn how to give and take, compromise, care, share, and otherwise enjoy the benefits of living cooperatively with others as compensation for the limits on freedom of action. These arrangements and rules are institutionalized and codified in tradition and law. The optimum balance of freedom and limits is called justice.

Academic Freedom in General

Just as we can consider human freedom as an abstract concept or as it applies to life in community in general, we can also consider the concept as it applies to a particular sphere of institutionalized social activity. The concept of academic freedom can be considered as abstracted from any particular academic institution. Drawing on our analysis above, we can say without extensive argument that academic freedom is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Whereas the concept of absolute freedom is not self-contradictory in itself, unlimited academic freedom is a contradiction in terms. For the modifier “academic” limits the word freedom. That’s what modifiers do. “Academic freedom” by definition directs—and therefore limits—freedom to serve the end of the academic enterprise, whatever that may be.

What is the end of the academic enterprise? The proper end of academia can be, has been, and (from my perspective) should be a matter of continuous enquiry. Historians of education often point to two master paradigms of education: (1) one focused on traditioning, character building, and moral training. This view may be called the classical paradigm, and it dominated education in the western world until recently. (2) The other paradigm directs its energy toward discovery of new knowledge, critical thinking, and developing skill in research methods. This view is relatively new, and some see its origin in 1810 with the founding of the University of Berlin. It has been called a never-ending, never-arriving “search for truth.” The clash of these two very different paradigms explains much of the contemporary debate about the scope and limits of academic freedom. If the end of the academy is traditioning, character formation, and moral training, academic freedom will be directed to whatever promotes those ends and exclusive of whatever thwarts achieving those ends. Similarly, if the end of the academy is the production of new knowledge and bold researchers, academic freedom will be directed to whatever activities promotes those ends and exclusive of whatever thwarts achieving them. An institution that attempts to work toward both ends will inevitably be involved in constant tension over the scope and limits on academic freedom.

Academic freedom, then, must be conceived as a means to a particular conception of the nature and end of the academic enterprise. The precise articulation of a theory or a policy on academic freedom must be accompanied by an implicit or explicit understanding of the ends of the academy. Discussing academic freedom without also seriously discussing the ends of the academic enterprise will produce nothing but a clash of subjective opinions and wishes determined as much by private interests as by rational discussion. And agreement on the one demands agreement on the other.

Academic Freedom in Individual Institutions

Drawing on our reasoning above, we know that the scope and limits on any coherent theory and policy of academic freedom must be based on a clear understanding of the nature and ends of the academic enterprise. Since there is no universally accepted understanding of the end of higher learning, there are bound to be differences among theorists on the end of the academy. And those different understandings have produced differences among institutions. In turn, those differences produce different understandings of the nature and scope of academic freedom, which will be reflected in policy. A research institution will naturally have a different understanding of academic freedom from that of an institution that conceives of its end as traditioning, character building, and moral training. It makes no sense for one type of institution to criticize the other for its policies on academic freedom. They are living from incommensurable paradigms. Let Providence be the judge of which institution has chosen the better end.

Academic Freedom in Christian Educational Institutions

What can we say about academic freedom in Christian institutions of higher learning? Much of what to say can be easily drawn from the line of reasoning developed above. Christian institutions of higher learning—if the designation “Christian” is not to be a meaningless holdover from another era—conceive their ends as determined by the truth, wisdom, and moral vision of the Christian faith. It makes sense that most Christian institutions of higher learning lean heavily on the classical (traditioning-character building-moral training) view of the end of education. After all, most Christian colleges were founded to defend, explain, and pass on the truth, wisdom, and moral vision of the Christian faith. And the concept of academic freedom that fits an institution devoted to research and production of new knowledge will not fit a Christian institution devoted to the ends I described above. Nor, of course, would it fit with any program of classical education.

In the past, from about 1880 to about 1980, Christian colleges were criticized by the dominant academic culture because they supposedly stifled the disinterested search for truth and the advance of knowledge in deference to their religious commitments. They limited the questions and answers researchers could pursue. Christian colleges were at fault for not accepting the view of academic freedom demanded by the dominant understanding of the ends of the academy. The academic enterprise should be carried on, they contended, according to its own internal rules rather than having to consider external authorities. Recently, however the dominant academic culture has begun criticizing both the Christian understanding and the older value-neutral research understanding of the ends of higher education and consequently it has begun to limit academic freedom in new ways. I am speaking of course of the rise of the political correctness, leftist politics, and wokeness that now dominates many institutions of higher education. The rise of political correctness signals a return to the traditioning and character-forming model of education but with a different tradition to pass on, a different moral vision to inculcate, and a different vision of how character should be formed. These institutions now openly suppress academic freedom in view of their new orthodoxy in ways they imagined Christian colleges did in the past in service to Christian orthodoxy. Measured by a classical liberal view of the social order and its value-neutral understanding of the search for truth the new orthodoxy is illiberal, intolerant, and unscientific. And so Christian institutions of higher learning must fight on two fronts to maintain their liberty to teach and learn according to their understanding of their ends.

If a Christian institution understands its reason for existence to be producing good human beings as measured by the Christian faith, if that is its non-negotiable end, then it will not accept any view of academic freedom that allows teachers to thwart achieving that end—either by restricting academic freedom to suppress politically incorrect speech or expanding academic freedom so as to undermine the Christian purpose of the college. Each particular Christian institution will have to define the scope and set the limits for academic freedom in its own way and according to its understanding of what activities help it achieve its ends or prevent it from doing so. But one thing is certain: the scope and limits of academic freedom in a Christian college must be determined not by an abstract concept of freedom, not by a general concept of academic freedom, not by a disinterested research ideal of academic freedom, and not by the new limits on academic freedom imposed by the politically correct academic establishment but by a clear and unapologetic understanding of the ends the institution holds dear.

Dust and Smoke: A Tale of Progressive Hypocrisy

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In the past few months I have been addressing the theme of the Bible and Christian ethics. I discussed some of the basic categories and concepts used in Christian ethics: the good, the right, moral law, divine commands, wisdom, the burden of proof, tradition, the concept of a “way of life,” and others. Since it is a burning contemporary issue that cannot be evaded, I have given special emphasis to how the Bible has been used in the contemporary debate over same-sex relationships. In a series of eleven essays I examined Karen Keen’s argument that evangelical churches should affirm loving, same-sex relationships as morally equal to traditional marriages between other-sex couples. I also reviewed Robert K. Gnuse’s argument against the usefulness of the traditional biblical proof texts for the contemporary debate. Gnuse is a progressive Lutheran supporter of mainline churches affirming same-sex relationships. Very soon I want to bring all these ideas to bear on a positive statement on the Christian ethical status of same-sex relationships and how the Bible may be properly used to support this traditional position. In preparation for this statement I want to take stock of where we stand.

Secular Progressives

It is important to keep in mind that the secular progressives do not care what the Bible says. They do not acknowledge its authority and may express great hostility toward it. They don’t mind hearing the Bible quoted as long as it echoes their views but will not accept any criticism of progressive morality based on the Bible. I am not speaking to this group in this series. This task would require a completely different approach. I am addressing people who for one reason or another claim to care what the Bible says. This group falls into two broad categories: traditionalist/conservative and progressive/liberal Christians.

Progressive versus Conservative

Not all progressive Christians are alike. Some reject or extensively revise the doctrines held dear by the historic tradition—the bodily resurrection of Jesus, the Trinity, the incarnation, and the call to conversion. I find it difficult to think of them as Christian at all. Some are less radical in their revisions. What they all have in common is that they feel compelled to revise traditional/biblical Christian doctrine and morals in view of “enlightened” modern culture. The dominant contemporary culture has given up all ethical principles by which it might condemn any behavior that does not involve coercion and lack of consent. The Enlightenment’s emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy, the Romantic Movement’s emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual’s inner self, and post-modernism’s debunking of objective truth have come together in contemporary culture to create a picture of each individual as a self-creating god who can do anything it wants as long as it does not do violence to other self-creating gods. And progressive Christians try to adjust their theology and ethics to this culture. They are as embarrassed by traditional Christian moral teaching as they would be if they suddenly found themselves naked at a Kennedy Center opera performance.

At times I wonder why progressive Christians even bother to appear to care what the Bible says. Traditionalists care what the Bible says because they place themselves under its authority and sincerely believe that God’s speaks through the Bible. They want to live in a community that lives according to the Bible’s teaching. When progressives engage in sophisticated exegesis and hermeneutics, such as that we find in Gnuse’s article, do they do this because they really care what the Bible says? Or, do they know already from the spirit of the times what the Bible should have said? I think some progressives work as hard as they do to reinterpret the Bible, not because they care what it teaches but because other less enlightened people care and stand in the way of moral progress. Progressive efforts seem designed to undermine the certainty of the traditional moral teaching while giving the appearance of sincere desire to understand the scriptures. In other words progressive writing on biblical exegesis and hermeneutics and theological ethics strikes the traditionalist as dissimulation and deception. And it will persuade only those who want to be persuaded.

Proof-Text Hypocrisy

As I outlined in the two previous essays, Robert K. Gnuse argues that the biblical proof texts most often quoted by traditionalists to condemn same-sex intercourse do not explicitly condemn all same-sex sexual relationships. They do not explicitly condemn loving, freely contracted same-sex relationships. These texts, progressives opine, are most likely directed to abusive relationships common in the culture of that day. And because they do not specifically target loving gay and lesbian relationships these passages are irrelevant to the contemporary question about the Christian legitimacy of same-sex relationships. We do not know what Paul would say about loving gay and lesbian relationships, progressives claim; we know only what he said about abusive same-sex relationships. Gnuse is not alone in adopting this line of argument. It is common among progressive Christian writers.

There is so much that could be said in response to the progressive strategy. But I will limit myself to one observation. It seems to me quite hypocritical for a progressive to argue in such a legalistic way. Progressives are not known for being sticklers for the letter of the law. Are we really to believe that if the New Testament undeniably condemned all same-sex intercourse, even between loving people, that progressives would dutifully follow the New Testament in its condemnation? I do not think so. Progressives also have many strategies for rejecting any explicit New Testament teaching that conflicts with progressive culture. When clear New Testament teaching conflicts with progressive dogma, progressive writers complain that the New Testament authors were limited by their patriarchal, unscientific, homophobic, and sexist culture.

When progressives argue in this legalistic way it is not because they want to obey the Bible to the letter. No. They argue this way to take advantage of the fact that traditionalists want to obey the Bible to the letter. And insofar as traditionalists think that the Bible teaches moral truth only by means of explicit divine commands, they set themselves up for the progressive trap. If somehow the supposed clarity of the biblical proof texts can be obscured by whatever means, the traditionalist is left without recourse. Progressives by throwing exegetical dust into the air and blowing hermeneutical smoke in traditionalists’ eyes hide the rank hypocrisy of their argument. For they have no intention of practicing what they preach.

Next Time: The Plasticity of Principles

“Seven Gay Texts”—A Review (Part Two)

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This essay continues my review of Robert K. Gnuse,“Seven Gay Texts: Biblical Passages Used to Condemn Homosexuality” (Biblical Theology Bulletin 45. 2: 68-87). In part one of the review I summarized Gnuse’s take on three Old Testament passages. In this essay I will examine his exegesis and theological interpretation of the New Testament passages that condemn same-sex intercourse.

 Vice Lists (1 Cor 6:9-10 & 1 Tim 1:8-11)

The vice list passages read as follows:

9 Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived! Fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites, 10 thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers—none of these will inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:9-10; NRSV).

8 Now we know that the law is good, if one uses it legitimately. 9 This means understanding that the law is laid down not for the innocent but for the lawless and disobedient, for the godless and sinful, for the unholy and profane, for those who kill their father or mother, for murderers, 10 fornicators, sodomites, slave traders, liars, perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to the sound teaching 11 that conforms to the glorious gospel of the blessed God, which he entrusted to me (1 Tim 1:8-11; NRSV).

The Greek words “male prostitutes” (malakoi) and “sodomites” (arsenokoitai) in 1 Corinthians 6:9 perhaps refer to the passive and the active partner in same-sex male intercourse. According to Gnuse, the NRSV translation of “malakoi” implies that these men allow sex to be performed on them for money or perhaps they are slaves who have no choice. And the translation of arsenokoitai as “sodomites” implies that these men are abusers of some type and may imply men who have sex with young boys. Gnuse concludes that when the two words are grouped together

“we have the two words that describe the homosexual relationships that would have been observed most frequently by Paul. These were the master, old man, abusive sexual partner, or pederast on the one hand, and the slave, young boy, or victim on the other hand…Ultimately, I believe both words describe abusive sexual relationships, not loving relationships between two adult, free males” (p. 80).

Gnuse interprets 1 Timothy 1:10 in much the same way as he interpreted 1 Corinthians 6:9. The word arsenokoitais is used in this passage also. Gnuse again concludes that “Homosexual love between two adult, free males or females may not be described here…[the New Testament] is condemning the violent use of sex to degrade and humiliate people, not sexual inclinations” (p. 81).

Romans 1

Romans 1:22-28 is often taken as the most unequivocal condemnation of all homosexual activity, male and female. Gnuse denies this conclusion. I will summarize the main thrust of his extensive argument. The text reads as follows:

22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools; 23 and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. 24 Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the degrading of their bodies among themselves, 25 because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen. 26 For this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their women exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural, 27 and in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse with women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and received in their own persons the due penalty for their error. 28 And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done.

As with all the other passages he examines, Gnuse argues that Paul in Romans 1:22-28 does not speak “about all homosexuals; he is speaking about a specific group of homosexuals who engage in a particular form of idolatrous worship” (p. 81). Gnuse argues that Paul targets the immoral behavior characteristic of certain religious cults resident in Rome. Gnuse argues that the most likely candidate for Paul’s invective is the Egyptian Isis cult. Paul condemns idolatry as false, dark, and foolish and asserts that this darkness gives birth to gross immorality unbefitting of one made in the image of God. According to Gnuse this passage does not condemn all homosexual behavior, only that performed in idolatrous worship.

Why, then, does Paul call this idolatrous homosexual behavior “unnatural”? Traditional interpreters contend that Paul’s argument makes no sense unless he assumes that homosexual behavior is immoral even apart from its connection to idolatry. Paul’s point is that this syndrome of immorality is what happens when people abandon the true God. Paul knows that the action of men abandoning relations with women and becoming “consumed with passion for one another” (v. 27) is perverse, degrading, and “unnatural” in itself apart from its connection to idol worship. Otherwise, his critique of idolatry would fall flat. For Paul wants his readers to understand that when people abandon God and worship nature instead, they will inevitably abandon the created order and the proper function of nature; bad things will happen.

In opposition to the traditional reading that decouples homosexual behavior from idolatry, Gnuse insists that Paul critiques only those homosexual acts performed in worship to pagan gods. Why, then, does Paul label these acts “unnatural”? Gnuse answers: “What Paul would find offensive about this cultic behavior, besides the obvious worship of other gods, is that the sexual behavior did not bring about procreation, and that is what makes it “unnatural” (p. 83). Gnuse has made a telling admission here. He admits that Paul can disengage homosexual acts from idolatry and view them negatively apart from their connection to pagan worship. They are “unnatural” everywhere and always and for everyone. But Gnuse’s contention that Paul viewed them as “unnatural” only because they do not produce children makes it easy for him to dismiss Paul’s judgment as cultural bias in favor of procreation as the sole purpose of sexual intercourse. It seems to me much more likely that Paul sees homosexual intercourse as “unnatural” because it violates the natural order intended by the creator and witnessed to by the power of procreation and by the obvious physiological complementarity. The foolish “exchange” of the glory of God for images of beasts (vss. 22-23) is mirrored by the degrading “exchange” of “natural intercourse for the unnatural” (v. 26).

What are the women mentioned in verse 26 doing when they “exchange natural intercourse for unnatural”? Gnuse points out correctly that Paul does not explicitly say that these women were having sex with other women, only that they were doing something “unnatural.” Gnuse floats the possibility that Paul has in mind a form of heterosexual intercourse designed to prevent procreation. I think this hypothesis is unlikely given what Paul says about men in the next verse, but in any case, Paul asserts that whatever these women are doing is “unnatural” and therefore wrong and shameful everywhere and always and for everyone.

Gnuse’s Conclusion

Given what he said about each text individually, Gnuse’s overall conclusion will not come as a surprise:

“I believe that there is no passage in the biblical text that truly condemns a sexual relationship between two adult, free people, who truly love each other….[Hence] biblical texts should not be called forth in the condemnation of gay and lesbian people in our society” (p. 83; emphasis mine).

Brief Comments

1. Notice the negative form of Gnuse’s conclusion. He offers many alternative interpretations of these texts, some of which I mentioned. Many of them are tenuous and speculative. Some give the impression of plausibility, but as his conclusion indicates the purpose of the article is not to defend any of these alternative interpretations. The entire discussion serves one purpose: to cast doubt on the untroubled certainty of the traditional view that these passages unambiguously condemn homosexual intercourse. The goal is to make illegitimate any theological use of these texts in the modern debate over homosexuality. It is to “problematize” the interpretation of these texts, to draw traditionalists into interminable debates, which—since we cannot arrive at a conclusion that ends all debate—leave the impression that everyone is free to think whatever they will and do whatever they want. And if you continue to interpret these texts in the traditional way, you can plausibly be accused of homophobia, that is, of irrational animus toward gay and lesbian people.

2. Gnuse turns the tables on traditionalists by shifting the burden of proof onto those who would use “the gay texts” in Christian ethics to condemn all forms of homosexual intercourse. Gnuse writes as if all he needs to do to win the argument is show that the texts do not explicitly address adult, free, and loving same-sex relationships. They may be directed exclusively to homosexual behavior that is abusive, violent, idolatrous, or linked with some other behavior that modern people also find it easy to condemn. If Gnuse can undermine the use of these biblical texts to condemn homosexual relations in general, traditionalists must abandon their strongest arguments and argue with progressives on their own turf—experience, science, psychology, and subjective feelings—on which they are at a disadvantage.

To be Continued…

“Seven Gay Texts”—A Review

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In the previous essay in this series on “The Bible and Christian Ethics” I argued that given the 2,000-year consensus of the Christian tradition on the subject of same-sex relationships, the contemporary church corporately and individually is “fully justified in being extremely skeptical of the argument made by some individuals that it has been wrong all these years in its understanding of…the teaching of the scriptures.” Traditional believers do not bear the burden of proof to justify their continued adherence to the traditional view of same-sex relationships.

Today I will examine a representative example of an argument that is used to set aside the 2,000-year consensus on the meaning of the Bible’s statements condemning same-sex intercourse. In his article “Seven Gay Texts: Biblical Passages Used to Condemn Homosexuality” (Biblical Theology Bulletin 45. 2: 68-87), Robert K. Gnuse aims to demonstrate that “there is no passage in the biblical text that truly condemns a sexual relationship between two adult, free people, who truly love each other” (p. 85). Hence the biblical passages that are traditionally used to condemn homosexual acts are irrelevant to the modern debate and “should not be called forth in the condemnation of gay and lesbian people in our society today” (p. 85). I will not take the space to do a full review of the very sophisticated historical and exegetical aspects of his argument. I will concentrate, rather, on the theological conclusions he draws from his exegetical work.

As the title indicates, the article examines the seven biblical passages most sited as condemning homosexual relationships. None of the passages, Gnuse argues, addresses the case of loving, adult relationships. All are directed at some abusive situation where there is idolatry, prostitution, lack of consent, or coercion. I will briefly summarize what he says about each passage.

“Seven Gay Texts”

The Curse of Ham (Genesis 9:20-27)

In this passage Ham, one of the three sons of Noah, looked on the naked body of his drunk father. After Noah sobered up he cursed Ham and his descendants. It is sometimes argued that Ham performed some sort of homosexual act on his unconscious father, which is the reason for the curse. The story is taken, then, to condemn homosexual acts in general. In response to this theological use of the text Gnuse points out that even if the text speaks of a homosexual act, it is also an act of incest and rape. The passage, then, cannot be used to condemn same-sex activity in general.

Sodom (Genesis 19:1-11; compare Judges 19:15-28)

This passage tells the story of the visit of two angels (apparently disguised as men) to the house of Lot and the demand by the men of the city of Sodom that Lot give his visitors to them so that they can rape them. Lot offers the men of the city his daughters instead, but the men angrily insist on having the visitors. In response, the angels struck the men with blindness. This story has been presented as proof of the Bible’s severe condemnation of homosexuality, so much so that the name of the city became a designation for homosexual acts and persons: Sodomy and Sodomite. Gnuse points out that homosexual rape (by heterosexuals) of strangers, slaves, and foreigners was a common way in the ancient world to humiliate and dominate vulnerable people. According to Gnuse, then, this passage condemns the men of Sodom for attempting to rape Lot’s visitors to whom he had given shelter. It “has nothing to do with homosexuality between free consenting adults in a loving relationship” (p. 73).

Leviticus 18:21-24 and 20:13

Leviticus 18: 21-24 condemns three practices: sacrificing children to Molech, same-sex intercourse, and bestiality. Verse 22 addresses same-sex intercourse: “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is abomination.” Traditionally, verse 22 has been taken as a clear condemnation of homosexual intercourse in general. And, apart from consideration of the context, verse 22 seems to condemn all forms of this behavior, no matter what the circumstances. Gnuse, however, argues that this verse may be directed to practices common in the cultic worship of Canaanite gods. Interestingly, Gnuse admits the possibility that the prohibition could refer to homosexual relations in general. But even if it does so, Gnuse attributes the prohibition to the Israelite obsession with maximizing population growth “because as a people they always faced a chronic population shortage” (p. 76). Implicit in Gnuse’s explanation is the thought that the waste of sperm and absence of reproduction are the real sins, not the same-sex acts themselves. If these concerns were removed, as they are in contemporary circumstances, the text would lose its force as a general moral rule. I will make one critical observation at this point. Notice that verse 21 does not explicitly condemn child sacrifice in general but only that made to Molech. According to the reasoning employed by Gnuse in dealing with verse 22, verse 21 leaves open the possibility of sacrificing children to gods other than Molech.

Leviticus 20:13 says, “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them.” On the face of it, this text condemns in very harsh terms homosexual intercourse in general. Gnuse takes this text also to refer to cultic prostitution, which would involve worshiping a Canaanite god or goddess. Gnuse concludes: “The real question is what the text really condemns, whether it be all homosexual behavior or cultic homosexual behavior. If it is cultic homosexual behavior, we should not use it in the modern debate” (p. 78).

How to “Theologize” Based on Biblical Texts

Gnuse’s replies to Robert Gagnon’s argument (The Bible and Homosexual Practice, Abingdon Press, 2001) that the Old Testament moral perspective at work in the texts themselves and in the background culture condemns all forms of homosexual behavior. Gnuse’s reply is worth quoting in full:

“He is probably correct about the cultural assumptions of that age and maybe even about the attitudes of the biblical authors. However, we theologize off of the texts, not the cultural assumptions of the age or something the biblical authors may have thought but did not write down….The homosexual texts, and the laws in particular, do not lead us anywhere; they simply prohibit certain forms of activity. But the bottom line is that we theologize off the texts, not our scholarly reconstruction of the cultural values of the authors. The texts appear to condemn rape and cultic prostitution, not generic homosexuality; we should not therefore conclude that all homosexual behavior is condemned” (p. 78).

If I am reading him correctly here he says that the Bible does not explicitly condemn loving, adult same-sex relationships, though we have good grounds to think that the biblical authors would have condemned them had they been asked about them. Nevertheless, we cannot use this knowledge to illuminate the texts or to inform the contemporary debate about same-sex relationships. In constructing Christian ethics, opines Gnuse, we are limited to what the biblical writers actually say about the circumstances at hand not what we think they would say about other circumstances.

I doubt that Gnuse can consistently apply this (very legalistic) rule to his own interpretation. The rule seems designed specifically to make these “gay” texts irrelevant to the current debate. Moreover it seems to me that this principle of theological interpretation makes it nearly impossible to argue successfully that the Bible teaches any ethics at all. For the Bible never speaks directly to contemporary circumstances. On any moral topic one can always assert that circumstances today differ from those addressed in these ancient texts.

To be Continued

Church, Tradition, and the Burden of Proof (The Bible and Christian Ethics, Part Five)

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Developing a clear understanding of how to apply the Bible to morality requires us to get clear on a few more preliminary matters before we enter into a discussion of the morality of same-sex intercourse and marriage and of gender fluidity. Otherwise we will be talking past each other. It is not as easy as looking in a concordance to find texts relevant to the topic under discussion.

Community

There is no use in quoting the Bible as an authority on moral issues to people who do not accept its authority. Hence the first clarification we must make is about the community to which we are speaking. Are we speaking to the Christian community, the church, or to the world? In other words, are we speaking to people who accept the authority of the Bible for their faith and practice, so that we can believe they are committed to accepting its moral teaching once they become clear what it is? Are we speaking to people who want to be part of that body and benefit from its faith, collective experience, and reflection? Otherwise we are wasting our time engaging in searching the scriptures for their teaching and engaging in exegesis and interpretation. Why expend energy working to understand the Bible’s moral teaching with people who don’t care what it says unless it confirms their preconceived opinions. We may find ourselves having serious disagreements even with those who say they affirm Scripture’s authority.

In this series, I am speaking to the Christian community. In this essay I am speaking to believers who hold to the traditional understanding of the moral status of same-sex intercourse…to encourage and strengthen you.

Tradition

As I hinted above, simply agreeing that the scriptures are “authoritative” (or “inspired,” “inerrant” or “infallible”) does not settle the issue of what the scriptures actually teach on a moral issue. Even people who claim to accept biblical authority differ on some issues. How, then, do we discover what the Bible teaches? Let’s remember what the goal of Christian ethics is: to articulate the moral rules the Christian church is obligated to live by and teach to its young and its converts. A Christian ethicist cannot merely speak from her or his wisdom or private opinion. They speak to, for, and with the Christian community about what that community is obligated to practice and teach. The church existed, lived, and taught about morality long before our generation. It has spent 2,000 years reflecting on what it means to live as a Christian according to the scriptures. Many wise, brilliant, and good Christian people have lived and thought about moral issues. The knowledge and wisdom of the church—what has been called “the mind of the church”—about the nature of the Christian life is embodied in its tradition. If the church is confronted by a Christian ethicist who wishes to argue against the consensus of its moral tradition—that is, what it has believed for 2,000 years is the teaching of the scriptures—the church is fully justified to place on such a person a heavy burden of proof.

On the issues of same-sex intercourse and marriage and gender fluidity, the church is fully justified in being extremely skeptical of the argument made by some individuals that it has been wrong all these years in its understanding of what is right and good and of its understanding of the teaching of the scriptures. The church does not bear the burden of proof here. And if you are unmoved by the arguments for the Christian legitimacy of same-sex marriages and for blurring the distinction between male and female, you are not obligated as a Christian to accept diversity of opinion and practice on these issues. If you wish to trust the 2,000 year consensus of tradition—and the plain meaning of the scriptures—on these issues above the sophistic exegesis and interpretation and appeals to emotion of its critics, you have every rational, theological, and moral right to do so. Do not be intimidated. You are not obligated to refute the critic’s arguments or prove tradition correct before you can continue to believe and live as you have been taught by the church.