I shall have more to say later…but I wanted to announce that my new book The Choice: Should the Church Affirm LGBTQ+ Identities and Ways of Living? is now available in paperback and Kindle. It will soon also be available in AI audio.
You can read the first 6 pages of the Introduction on Amazon.com.
More later.
For some time now, I have been pursuing the question of the proper use of the Bible in Christian ethics, using the issue of same-sex relationships as a test case. This essay is the tenth in this series, which is a sub-series within a larger 35-essay series on Christianity and the contemporary moral crisis that began July 01, 2021. Though there is much more to be said, it is now time for me to end this series by stating in a positive way my view of the proper way to use scripture to address this issue.
Investigation into the proper “use” of scripture in Christian theology and ethics presupposes someone or some group that “uses” it. Who is that? Are we speaking about individual believers, exegetes, and theologians? Or, are we speaking about churches and denominations? Individuals are free to “use” scripture according to their understanding to construct their personal theological and ethical systems. But the opinions of individuals possess no authority for others. No Christian is obligated to accept an individual’s opinion as binding Christian doctrine. The discussion about same-sex unions is ultimately about what the church should teach and what moral behaviors the church should promote, accept, or condemn for its members. In contemporary society a person is legally free to have sex with whomever they please as long as there is mutual consent. In these essays I am not discussing sexual ethics for contemporary society. I am discussing whether or not the church should affirm those who claim to be Christians and wish to participate in the life of the church while also living in a same-sex sexual relationship. How should the church use scripture in its deliberations?
It is not enough for exegetes to opine on what the scriptures say about same-sex relationships. The church has to decide what it should say to itself and the world about this matter in obedience to scripture. The church may wish to hear the opinions of individual exegetes, historians, and theologians as part of its deliberations. But no matter how ingenious or sophisticated they may be, these proposals possess no doctrinal or ecclesiastical authority. The church as a community must decide in the spirit of obedience whether or not it should affirm same-sex unions as morally acceptable Christian behavior within that community.
Christian denominations often acknowledge areas where diverse private opinions on theology are allowed and different areas where private choices of ways of life are permitted. But nearly all Christian denominations hold adherence to some doctrines necessary and anyone who teaches a different doctrine is deemed a heretic. The recalcitrant person may be stripped of their office and excluded from teaching within the church. Likewise, anyone guilty of behaviors deemed by the denomination as immoral is subject to discipline and perhaps excommunication. And a person who rejects the church’s moral teaching and teaches others to do the same may be subject to excommunication.
A church’s official doctrine and moral teaching are the result of long-term communal experience and reflection on scripture, perhaps reaching all the way back to the apostles. Whereas most churches do not hold their confessions of faith to be infallible and irreformable, they are, nevertheless, slow to accept proposals for radical change. There is much to consider, too much for any one individual to grasp and too important to rush the process. On the matter of the moral status of same-sex unions, it would be difficult to find a moral or doctrinal teaching on which there is a greater and longer-term consensus within the world-wide church. The church is right to be skeptical of proposals that interpret the scriptures in ways radically different from the way it has understood them for 2,000 years. As I demonstrated in my reviews of works by Karen Keen and Robert Gnuse, critics of the tradition can achieve no more than opening a mere possibility that the Bible does not condemn loving, non-coercive homosexual relationships along with its clear condemnation of exploitive same-sex intercourse. Gnuse admits that Paul probably would have condemned even non-coercive same-sex relationships, if he had been asked about them. The leap from these meager, tentative, and speculative exegetical results to affirmation of same-sex unions as morally equal to traditional marriage is huge and completely unwarranted. It seems to me that those who make this giant leap do so for reasons other than desire to obey scripture and use their exegetical gymnastics as a diversion to distract readers from the real reasons for their decision.
How does the church make decisions on doctrine and morals? The first thing on which to get clear is that the Christian church does not claim the freedom to create doctrine and moral law arbitrarily or to change it to fit the spirit of the age. Faithful churches acknowledge that they are charged with passing on the faith as they received it from Christ and his apostles. For my part, I will not acknowledge any institution as the church that will not make this confession or that I sense does not make it sincerely. Hence the church’s decision-making process should focus on remaining faithful to the original gospel and moral vision in our present circumstances. I am suspicious of any church that seems to allow other concerns to divert it from this task. Churches, too, can be carried away by grave error and even become heretical.
The second thing to keep in mind is that the decision-making process of the church cannot be made completely formal and procedural. For example, it cannot be carried out through the mechanisms of direct democracy wherein a majority of the living members can legislate for the whole body. Nor is the church a representative democracy. It is certainly not a dictatorship. The goal is not to canvass the will of the people but to discern the will of God and seek God’s guidance on how best to remain faithful in the present age. On matters that a church—a local congregation, a denomination, or the ecumenical church—confesses and teaches to itself and the world, the community as a whole must come to consensus on the issue, and this may take a long time. And the process of coming to consensus may take place quite informally. And of course on most doctrinal and moral issues the present consensus was achieved centuries ago and reaffirmed by many succeeding generations of believers.
With respect to the challenge of those who argue that the church should affirm same-sex unions on the same basis as it affirms traditional marriage, what factors should the church consider? If it is determined to remain faithful, the church must continue to read scripture as the standard of its faith and morals. Because it is open to deepening its understanding of God’s will, the church will not refuse to listen to voices that propose new interpretations of scripture. But the church did not begin to read and interpret scripture yesterday. Hence it listens to those new interpretations only in light of what it has been taught by tradition. Tradition embodies the long-term, time-tested wisdom of the faithful about the meaning of the scriptures, and a church that desires to be faithful will not discard it lightly. The burden of proof will always fall on those who challenge the wisdom of tradition. Moreover, the church will exercise discernment about whether or not these new voices speak with sincere desire to seek the will of God or speak deceptively. Both Jesus and the beloved disciple tell us not to be naïve about new teachings:
“Watch out for false prophets. They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ferocious wolves. By their fruits you will recognize them” (Matthew 7:15-16). “Dear friends, do not believe every spirit, but test the spirits to see whether they are from God, because many false prophets have gone out into the world” (1 John 4:1).
I cannot speak for the whole church or any particular congregation or denomination, and I possess no authority to obligate anyone to obedience. However, I urge believers individually and the church corporately not to be deceived by sophisticated arguments that, contrary to the unanimous Christian tradition and against the grain of reason, claim that scripture does not condemn and perhaps even approves of same-sex unions. I believe these arguments possess moving force only for those already persuaded by the spirit of the age, which elevates the authority of a subjective sense of identity and well-being above reason, moral law, traditional wisdom, and scriptural teaching.
In the past few months I have been addressing the theme of the Bible and Christian ethics. I discussed some of the basic categories and concepts used in Christian ethics: the good, the right, moral law, divine commands, wisdom, the burden of proof, tradition, the concept of a “way of life,” and others. Since it is a burning contemporary issue that cannot be evaded, I have given special emphasis to how the Bible has been used in the contemporary debate over same-sex relationships. In a series of eleven essays I examined Karen Keen’s argument that evangelical churches should affirm loving, same-sex relationships as morally equal to traditional marriages between other-sex couples. I also reviewed Robert K. Gnuse’s argument against the usefulness of the traditional biblical proof texts for the contemporary debate. Gnuse is a progressive Lutheran supporter of mainline churches affirming same-sex relationships. Very soon I want to bring all these ideas to bear on a positive statement on the Christian ethical status of same-sex relationships and how the Bible may be properly used to support this traditional position. In preparation for this statement I want to take stock of where we stand.
It is important to keep in mind that the secular progressives do not care what the Bible says. They do not acknowledge its authority and may express great hostility toward it. They don’t mind hearing the Bible quoted as long as it echoes their views but will not accept any criticism of progressive morality based on the Bible. I am not speaking to this group in this series. This task would require a completely different approach. I am addressing people who for one reason or another claim to care what the Bible says. This group falls into two broad categories: traditionalist/conservative and progressive/liberal Christians.
Not all progressive Christians are alike. Some reject or extensively revise the doctrines held dear by the historic tradition—the bodily resurrection of Jesus, the Trinity, the incarnation, and the call to conversion. I find it difficult to think of them as Christian at all. Some are less radical in their revisions. What they all have in common is that they feel compelled to revise traditional/biblical Christian doctrine and morals in view of “enlightened” modern culture. The dominant contemporary culture has given up all ethical principles by which it might condemn any behavior that does not involve coercion and lack of consent. The Enlightenment’s emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy, the Romantic Movement’s emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual’s inner self, and post-modernism’s debunking of objective truth have come together in contemporary culture to create a picture of each individual as a self-creating god who can do anything it wants as long as it does not do violence to other self-creating gods. And progressive Christians try to adjust their theology and ethics to this culture. They are as embarrassed by traditional Christian moral teaching as they would be if they suddenly found themselves naked at a Kennedy Center opera performance.
At times I wonder why progressive Christians even bother to appear to care what the Bible says. Traditionalists care what the Bible says because they place themselves under its authority and sincerely believe that God’s speaks through the Bible. They want to live in a community that lives according to the Bible’s teaching. When progressives engage in sophisticated exegesis and hermeneutics, such as that we find in Gnuse’s article, do they do this because they really care what the Bible says? Or, do they know already from the spirit of the times what the Bible should have said? I think some progressives work as hard as they do to reinterpret the Bible, not because they care what it teaches but because other less enlightened people care and stand in the way of moral progress. Progressive efforts seem designed to undermine the certainty of the traditional moral teaching while giving the appearance of sincere desire to understand the scriptures. In other words progressive writing on biblical exegesis and hermeneutics and theological ethics strikes the traditionalist as dissimulation and deception. And it will persuade only those who want to be persuaded.
As I outlined in the two previous essays, Robert K. Gnuse argues that the biblical proof texts most often quoted by traditionalists to condemn same-sex intercourse do not explicitly condemn all same-sex sexual relationships. They do not explicitly condemn loving, freely contracted same-sex relationships. These texts, progressives opine, are most likely directed to abusive relationships common in the culture of that day. And because they do not specifically target loving gay and lesbian relationships these passages are irrelevant to the contemporary question about the Christian legitimacy of same-sex relationships. We do not know what Paul would say about loving gay and lesbian relationships, progressives claim; we know only what he said about abusive same-sex relationships. Gnuse is not alone in adopting this line of argument. It is common among progressive Christian writers.
There is so much that could be said in response to the progressive strategy. But I will limit myself to one observation. It seems to me quite hypocritical for a progressive to argue in such a legalistic way. Progressives are not known for being sticklers for the letter of the law. Are we really to believe that if the New Testament undeniably condemned all same-sex intercourse, even between loving people, that progressives would dutifully follow the New Testament in its condemnation? I do not think so. Progressives also have many strategies for rejecting any explicit New Testament teaching that conflicts with progressive culture. When clear New Testament teaching conflicts with progressive dogma, progressive writers complain that the New Testament authors were limited by their patriarchal, unscientific, homophobic, and sexist culture.
When progressives argue in this legalistic way it is not because they want to obey the Bible to the letter. No. They argue this way to take advantage of the fact that traditionalists want to obey the Bible to the letter. And insofar as traditionalists think that the Bible teaches moral truth only by means of explicit divine commands, they set themselves up for the progressive trap. If somehow the supposed clarity of the biblical proof texts can be obscured by whatever means, the traditionalist is left without recourse. Progressives by throwing exegetical dust into the air and blowing hermeneutical smoke in traditionalists’ eyes hide the rank hypocrisy of their argument. For they have no intention of practicing what they preach.
Next Time: The Plasticity of Principles
This essay continues my review of Robert K. Gnuse,“Seven Gay Texts: Biblical Passages Used to Condemn Homosexuality” (Biblical Theology Bulletin 45. 2: 68-87). In part one of the review I summarized Gnuse’s take on three Old Testament passages. In this essay I will examine his exegesis and theological interpretation of the New Testament passages that condemn same-sex intercourse.
The vice list passages read as follows:
9 Do you not know that wrongdoers will not inherit the kingdom of God? Do not be deceived! Fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, male prostitutes, sodomites, 10 thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers—none of these will inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:9-10; NRSV).
8 Now we know that the law is good, if one uses it legitimately. 9 This means understanding that the law is laid down not for the innocent but for the lawless and disobedient, for the godless and sinful, for the unholy and profane, for those who kill their father or mother, for murderers, 10 fornicators, sodomites, slave traders, liars, perjurers, and whatever else is contrary to the sound teaching 11 that conforms to the glorious gospel of the blessed God, which he entrusted to me (1 Tim 1:8-11; NRSV).
The Greek words “male prostitutes” (malakoi) and “sodomites” (arsenokoitai) in 1 Corinthians 6:9 perhaps refer to the passive and the active partner in same-sex male intercourse. According to Gnuse, the NRSV translation of “malakoi” implies that these men allow sex to be performed on them for money or perhaps they are slaves who have no choice. And the translation of arsenokoitai as “sodomites” implies that these men are abusers of some type and may imply men who have sex with young boys. Gnuse concludes that when the two words are grouped together
“we have the two words that describe the homosexual relationships that would have been observed most frequently by Paul. These were the master, old man, abusive sexual partner, or pederast on the one hand, and the slave, young boy, or victim on the other hand…Ultimately, I believe both words describe abusive sexual relationships, not loving relationships between two adult, free males” (p. 80).
Gnuse interprets 1 Timothy 1:10 in much the same way as he interpreted 1 Corinthians 6:9. The word arsenokoitais is used in this passage also. Gnuse again concludes that “Homosexual love between two adult, free males or females may not be described here…[the New Testament] is condemning the violent use of sex to degrade and humiliate people, not sexual inclinations” (p. 81).
Romans 1:22-28 is often taken as the most unequivocal condemnation of all homosexual activity, male and female. Gnuse denies this conclusion. I will summarize the main thrust of his extensive argument. The text reads as follows:
22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools; 23 and they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling a mortal human being or birds or four-footed animals or reptiles. 24 Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the degrading of their bodies among themselves, 25 because they exchanged the truth about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen. 26 For this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their women exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural, 27 and in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse with women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and received in their own persons the due penalty for their error. 28 And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done.
As with all the other passages he examines, Gnuse argues that Paul in Romans 1:22-28 does not speak “about all homosexuals; he is speaking about a specific group of homosexuals who engage in a particular form of idolatrous worship” (p. 81). Gnuse argues that Paul targets the immoral behavior characteristic of certain religious cults resident in Rome. Gnuse argues that the most likely candidate for Paul’s invective is the Egyptian Isis cult. Paul condemns idolatry as false, dark, and foolish and asserts that this darkness gives birth to gross immorality unbefitting of one made in the image of God. According to Gnuse this passage does not condemn all homosexual behavior, only that performed in idolatrous worship.
Why, then, does Paul call this idolatrous homosexual behavior “unnatural”? Traditional interpreters contend that Paul’s argument makes no sense unless he assumes that homosexual behavior is immoral even apart from its connection to idolatry. Paul’s point is that this syndrome of immorality is what happens when people abandon the true God. Paul knows that the action of men abandoning relations with women and becoming “consumed with passion for one another” (v. 27) is perverse, degrading, and “unnatural” in itself apart from its connection to idol worship. Otherwise, his critique of idolatry would fall flat. For Paul wants his readers to understand that when people abandon God and worship nature instead, they will inevitably abandon the created order and the proper function of nature; bad things will happen.
In opposition to the traditional reading that decouples homosexual behavior from idolatry, Gnuse insists that Paul critiques only those homosexual acts performed in worship to pagan gods. Why, then, does Paul label these acts “unnatural”? Gnuse answers: “What Paul would find offensive about this cultic behavior, besides the obvious worship of other gods, is that the sexual behavior did not bring about procreation, and that is what makes it “unnatural” (p. 83). Gnuse has made a telling admission here. He admits that Paul can disengage homosexual acts from idolatry and view them negatively apart from their connection to pagan worship. They are “unnatural” everywhere and always and for everyone. But Gnuse’s contention that Paul viewed them as “unnatural” only because they do not produce children makes it easy for him to dismiss Paul’s judgment as cultural bias in favor of procreation as the sole purpose of sexual intercourse. It seems to me much more likely that Paul sees homosexual intercourse as “unnatural” because it violates the natural order intended by the creator and witnessed to by the power of procreation and by the obvious physiological complementarity. The foolish “exchange” of the glory of God for images of beasts (vss. 22-23) is mirrored by the degrading “exchange” of “natural intercourse for the unnatural” (v. 26).
What are the women mentioned in verse 26 doing when they “exchange natural intercourse for unnatural”? Gnuse points out correctly that Paul does not explicitly say that these women were having sex with other women, only that they were doing something “unnatural.” Gnuse floats the possibility that Paul has in mind a form of heterosexual intercourse designed to prevent procreation. I think this hypothesis is unlikely given what Paul says about men in the next verse, but in any case, Paul asserts that whatever these women are doing is “unnatural” and therefore wrong and shameful everywhere and always and for everyone.
Given what he said about each text individually, Gnuse’s overall conclusion will not come as a surprise:
“I believe that there is no passage in the biblical text that truly condemns a sexual relationship between two adult, free people, who truly love each other….[Hence] biblical texts should not be called forth in the condemnation of gay and lesbian people in our society” (p. 83; emphasis mine).
1. Notice the negative form of Gnuse’s conclusion. He offers many alternative interpretations of these texts, some of which I mentioned. Many of them are tenuous and speculative. Some give the impression of plausibility, but as his conclusion indicates the purpose of the article is not to defend any of these alternative interpretations. The entire discussion serves one purpose: to cast doubt on the untroubled certainty of the traditional view that these passages unambiguously condemn homosexual intercourse. The goal is to make illegitimate any theological use of these texts in the modern debate over homosexuality. It is to “problematize” the interpretation of these texts, to draw traditionalists into interminable debates, which—since we cannot arrive at a conclusion that ends all debate—leave the impression that everyone is free to think whatever they will and do whatever they want. And if you continue to interpret these texts in the traditional way, you can plausibly be accused of homophobia, that is, of irrational animus toward gay and lesbian people.
2. Gnuse turns the tables on traditionalists by shifting the burden of proof onto those who would use “the gay texts” in Christian ethics to condemn all forms of homosexual intercourse. Gnuse writes as if all he needs to do to win the argument is show that the texts do not explicitly address adult, free, and loving same-sex relationships. They may be directed exclusively to homosexual behavior that is abusive, violent, idolatrous, or linked with some other behavior that modern people also find it easy to condemn. If Gnuse can undermine the use of these biblical texts to condemn homosexual relations in general, traditionalists must abandon their strongest arguments and argue with progressives on their own turf—experience, science, psychology, and subjective feelings—on which they are at a disadvantage.
To be Continued…
In the previous essay in this series on “The Bible and Christian Ethics” I argued that given the 2,000-year consensus of the Christian tradition on the subject of same-sex relationships, the contemporary church corporately and individually is “fully justified in being extremely skeptical of the argument made by some individuals that it has been wrong all these years in its understanding of…the teaching of the scriptures.” Traditional believers do not bear the burden of proof to justify their continued adherence to the traditional view of same-sex relationships.
Today I will examine a representative example of an argument that is used to set aside the 2,000-year consensus on the meaning of the Bible’s statements condemning same-sex intercourse. In his article “Seven Gay Texts: Biblical Passages Used to Condemn Homosexuality” (Biblical Theology Bulletin 45. 2: 68-87), Robert K. Gnuse aims to demonstrate that “there is no passage in the biblical text that truly condemns a sexual relationship between two adult, free people, who truly love each other” (p. 85). Hence the biblical passages that are traditionally used to condemn homosexual acts are irrelevant to the modern debate and “should not be called forth in the condemnation of gay and lesbian people in our society today” (p. 85). I will not take the space to do a full review of the very sophisticated historical and exegetical aspects of his argument. I will concentrate, rather, on the theological conclusions he draws from his exegetical work.
As the title indicates, the article examines the seven biblical passages most sited as condemning homosexual relationships. None of the passages, Gnuse argues, addresses the case of loving, adult relationships. All are directed at some abusive situation where there is idolatry, prostitution, lack of consent, or coercion. I will briefly summarize what he says about each passage.
In this passage Ham, one of the three sons of Noah, looked on the naked body of his drunk father. After Noah sobered up he cursed Ham and his descendants. It is sometimes argued that Ham performed some sort of homosexual act on his unconscious father, which is the reason for the curse. The story is taken, then, to condemn homosexual acts in general. In response to this theological use of the text Gnuse points out that even if the text speaks of a homosexual act, it is also an act of incest and rape. The passage, then, cannot be used to condemn same-sex activity in general.
This passage tells the story of the visit of two angels (apparently disguised as men) to the house of Lot and the demand by the men of the city of Sodom that Lot give his visitors to them so that they can rape them. Lot offers the men of the city his daughters instead, but the men angrily insist on having the visitors. In response, the angels struck the men with blindness. This story has been presented as proof of the Bible’s severe condemnation of homosexuality, so much so that the name of the city became a designation for homosexual acts and persons: Sodomy and Sodomite. Gnuse points out that homosexual rape (by heterosexuals) of strangers, slaves, and foreigners was a common way in the ancient world to humiliate and dominate vulnerable people. According to Gnuse, then, this passage condemns the men of Sodom for attempting to rape Lot’s visitors to whom he had given shelter. It “has nothing to do with homosexuality between free consenting adults in a loving relationship” (p. 73).
Leviticus 18: 21-24 condemns three practices: sacrificing children to Molech, same-sex intercourse, and bestiality. Verse 22 addresses same-sex intercourse: “You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is abomination.” Traditionally, verse 22 has been taken as a clear condemnation of homosexual intercourse in general. And, apart from consideration of the context, verse 22 seems to condemn all forms of this behavior, no matter what the circumstances. Gnuse, however, argues that this verse may be directed to practices common in the cultic worship of Canaanite gods. Interestingly, Gnuse admits the possibility that the prohibition could refer to homosexual relations in general. But even if it does so, Gnuse attributes the prohibition to the Israelite obsession with maximizing population growth “because as a people they always faced a chronic population shortage” (p. 76). Implicit in Gnuse’s explanation is the thought that the waste of sperm and absence of reproduction are the real sins, not the same-sex acts themselves. If these concerns were removed, as they are in contemporary circumstances, the text would lose its force as a general moral rule. I will make one critical observation at this point. Notice that verse 21 does not explicitly condemn child sacrifice in general but only that made to Molech. According to the reasoning employed by Gnuse in dealing with verse 22, verse 21 leaves open the possibility of sacrificing children to gods other than Molech.
Leviticus 20:13 says, “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, their blood is upon them.” On the face of it, this text condemns in very harsh terms homosexual intercourse in general. Gnuse takes this text also to refer to cultic prostitution, which would involve worshiping a Canaanite god or goddess. Gnuse concludes: “The real question is what the text really condemns, whether it be all homosexual behavior or cultic homosexual behavior. If it is cultic homosexual behavior, we should not use it in the modern debate” (p. 78).
Gnuse’s replies to Robert Gagnon’s argument (The Bible and Homosexual Practice, Abingdon Press, 2001) that the Old Testament moral perspective at work in the texts themselves and in the background culture condemns all forms of homosexual behavior. Gnuse’s reply is worth quoting in full:
“He is probably correct about the cultural assumptions of that age and maybe even about the attitudes of the biblical authors. However, we theologize off of the texts, not the cultural assumptions of the age or something the biblical authors may have thought but did not write down….The homosexual texts, and the laws in particular, do not lead us anywhere; they simply prohibit certain forms of activity. But the bottom line is that we theologize off the texts, not our scholarly reconstruction of the cultural values of the authors. The texts appear to condemn rape and cultic prostitution, not generic homosexuality; we should not therefore conclude that all homosexual behavior is condemned” (p. 78).
If I am reading him correctly here he says that the Bible does not explicitly condemn loving, adult same-sex relationships, though we have good grounds to think that the biblical authors would have condemned them had they been asked about them. Nevertheless, we cannot use this knowledge to illuminate the texts or to inform the contemporary debate about same-sex relationships. In constructing Christian ethics, opines Gnuse, we are limited to what the biblical writers actually say about the circumstances at hand not what we think they would say about other circumstances.
I doubt that Gnuse can consistently apply this (very legalistic) rule to his own interpretation. The rule seems designed specifically to make these “gay” texts irrelevant to the current debate. Moreover it seems to me that this principle of theological interpretation makes it nearly impossible to argue successfully that the Bible teaches any ethics at all. For the Bible never speaks directly to contemporary circumstances. On any moral topic one can always assert that circumstances today differ from those addressed in these ancient texts.
To be Continued
In this essay I will finish my chapter-by-chapter summary, analysis, and critique of Karen Keen’s book, Scripture, Ethics, and the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships. In this series I followed Keen’s outline, used her vocabulary, and let her frame the issues. However after today’s essay, with Keen’s argument and my analysis still fresh on our minds, I plan to reflect on the issue of same-sex relationships a bit more independently.
In chapter 8, “Imagining a New Response to the Gay and Lesbian Community,” Keen makes her final appeal for changes in the way evangelical believers relate to gay and lesbian Christians. She opens the chapter by summarizing her foregoing conclusions and urging readers to allow the following principles to inform the debate:
“Scripture interpretation requires recognizing the overarching intent of biblical mandates, namely, a good and just world.”
“Scripture itself teaches us that biblical mandates, including creation ordinances, cannot be applied without a deliberative process.”
“Evidence indicates that life-long celibacy is not achievable for every person.”
“Evidence shows that same-sex attraction is not moral fallenness; it could be understood as natural fallenness or human variation.”
On the basis of these four assertions, which are the conclusions to which the previous chapters have come, Keen argues that there are three ways evangelicals can embrace same-sex relationships without abandoning their evangelical faith:
First, the “traditionalist exception” view enables even those who believe that same-sex relationships are wrong to accept them as accommodations to human weakness because covenanted, loving relationships are better than promiscuity. Second, the “traditionalist case-law” view accepts the principle that we must take into account the “overarching intent” of biblical mandates. Given that many gay and lesbian people cannot remain celibate and that their determination to live good lives would be greatly strengthen by remaining within the Christian community, traditionalists could view the relationship as morally acceptable.
Third, the “affirming” view accepts gay and lesbian relationships on the same basis as those between other-sex couples. The affirming view sees the biblical prohibitions as “prescientific” in the same way as the biblical cosmology is prescientific. The affirming view bases its acceptance of same-sex relationships not on the letter but the intent of biblical sexual regulations. For the Bible’s rules for sex are designed to prevent harm and facilitate “a good and just world.” “Same-sex relationships are not harmful by virtue of their same-sex nature,” Keen adds. They become harmful in the same way other-sex relationships become harmful, that is, when they are poisoned by betrayal, violence, coercion, deception, manipulation, and other unloving attitudes and acts.
In the last section of the book, Keen recounts her journey from her introduction as an infant to “a small-town conservative Baptist church” to the frightening—in some ways shattering—experience in her late teens of “falling in love” with her best female friend. Keen continues her story by recounting some of the stages in her twenty-year spiritual and intellectual quest to understand herself as gay and an evangelical Christian. I will not attempt to summarize in detail Keen’s story. I could not possibly do justice to the confusion, pathos, feelings of isolation and loneliness, and suffering that at times shows through her rather straightforward account. Her book is the fruit of her intellectual journey…so far.
From the beginning I’ve been struck with way Keen combines her intellectual arguments from biblical exegesis/interpretation and science with her pragmatic goals. In this last chapter we see highlighted her practical, pastoral side. Clearly Keen would prefer that evangelicals accept her exegetical/hermeneutical case for accepting loving, covenanted, same-sex relationships on the same basis as other-sex loving, covenanted relationships. But she is willing to tolerate the “traditionalist exception” and “traditionalist case-law” views—though they are far from ideal—as ways to achieve her practical goal of having evangelical churches allow same-sex couples to participate in the life of the church without having to deny their identities or struggle unhappily and unsuccessfully to remain celibate. Keen will not allow fanatical desire for ideological purity to stand in the way of achieving her practical aim. I am only speculating here, but perhaps she hopes that once churches allow gay relationships, even on a less than ideal basis, they may be persuaded to move on to the “accepting” view by coming to understand gay people on a personal level.
It is foolish as well as arrogant and uncaring to argue with someone’s telling of their story or to diminish the significance of their self-reported experiences. People feel what they feel and experience what they experience, and no one knows this better than they do. The quickest way to alienate a contemporary audience is to appear unsympathetic to anyone society has designated a victim of oppression. Hence it is almost impossible for members of officially recognized oppressed groups to resist using their stories of struggle and oppression as proof that they are on the right side of history, justice, and goodness; anyone not sympathetic with them is by that very fact on the wrong side. I appreciate very much that Karen Keen resists this temptation. Along with everyone else she knows that feeling that something is good or right or true does not make it good or right or true. Things are good or true or right independently of our private experience. To assume otherwise would destroy the very idea of morality. Nor can telling one’s story serve as proof for anything other than the subjective experience of the story teller. A listener has no rational or moral obligation to accept a story full of pathos and suffering as proof of anything other than the emotional state of the story teller. Such stories rightly evoke compassion but cannot legitimately command agreement.
It would take a hard heart indeed not to be moved by Karen Keen’s story and stories like hers. And I do not have a hard heart, and I never have. Her first church experience was not unlike my own, of a small, very traditional, and Bible-centered congregation. She wanted to become a missionary, and I wanted to preach the gospel in the church. I too made a journey through graduate study of the Bible and theology, confronting all the critical questions modern historians, biblical scholars, philosophers, and theologians raise about our faith. I am also passionate about healthy teaching in the church and the care of the little lambs in Jesus’s flock. We both published books with Eerdmans Publishing Company. I do not, however, have her experience of being a woman or of having same-sex attraction. I do not consider myself better than her on this account. I know that I am worthy only to pray the tax collector’s prayer, “God be merciful to me, a sinner.” This is also my prayer and hope for everyone, including Karen Keen.
Since I read Keen’s book the first time and looked at her website, I’ve felt a great love for her. I find her story compelling in many ways. And yet, I find myself unmoved by her argument that accepting same-sex relationships is consistent with a Bible-based evangelical faith for all the reasons I’ve laid out in this eleven-part review.
This essay is the tenth part of my critical and analytical review of Karen Keen, Scripture, Ethics, and the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships.* Today I will deal with chapter 7, “Is it Adam’s Fault? Why the Origin of Same-sex Attraction Matters.”
In chapter 7, Keen argues that one’s view on the origin of same-sex attraction matters in assessing its moral status. She considers three options on the issue of origins.
The first view asserts that same-sex attraction is rooted in our “moral fallenness”—some form of the doctrine of original sin—that is, the universal tendency to sin inherited from Adam. In this case same-sex desire falls into the same category as other such sinful desires as lust, pride, greed, envy, and hate. Individuals are morally culpable both for the desire and the acts that gratify the desire. We are obligated not to act on these desires and to purify our hearts of them insofar as possible. Keen rejects the first option as untenable exegetically and theologically and erroneous according to the best scientific understanding of human origins. According to Keen, the story of the creation and fall of human beings in “Genesis portrays a theological and not a scientific account of human origins.”
The second option locates the origin of same-sex attraction in “natural fallenness.” Natural fallenness refers to the divine “curse” resulting from the fall (Genesis 3) and includes sickness, death, and natural evils. On this reading, same-sex attraction falls into the same category as birth defects, chemical imbalances, abnormal brain development, genetic diseases, and other deviations from health of body and mind. Those afflicted with such ills had no choice in the matter. Keen seems to think the second option is an improvement over the first, because it does not attribute same-sex attraction to a morally corrupt nature or malicious choices. Drawing on her hermeneutical studies in previous chapters—for example, Paul’s accommodation of some single people’s inability to remain celibate—Keen argues that evangelical believers ought to accommodate this “disability” in the same way we have accommodated other “imperfections” among people. Allowing gay and lesbian people to form “covenanted relationships” for “companionship and support” would be the most helpful way to enable people “to live with the actual bodies they have.” It is clear, however, that Keen does not think that this view accounts for all the biological, psychological, and experiential data, for it implies that there is something wrong or “imperfect” with gay and lesbian people. Gay and lesbian Christians would inevitably be treated as second class citizens of the kingdom of God.
The third option, clearly preferred by Keen, treats same-sex attraction as a natural variation within a population—morally neutral and non-disabling. Only about ten percent of the human population, for example, is left-handed. Historically, left-handed people were considered flawed and devious. Even in the modern era parents and therapists attempted to “fix” left-handed people. There is now in the Western world a consensus that “there is nothing wrong with being left-handed.” Keen recommends that Christians view same-sex desire in the same way as we view left-handedness, as a natural variation that consistently characterizes three to five percent of the population. It is not a sin or a curse but a “gift of difference.”
What is the force of Keen’s argument?
Keen’s argument progresses from a viewpoint that roots same-sex desire in Adam’s sin to a view that roots it in the negative effects (the curse) of Adam’s sin to a view that denies altogether the immoral or defective nature of the origins of same-sex desire. In other words, the force and direction of the argument from the origin of same-sex desire to its moral status changes as Keen’s argument progresses. As Keen presents it, the first view taints present same-sex attraction with the sinful character of its origin in Adam’s sin. The second view removes the taint of sin from same-sex attraction but leaves unchanged its status as a defect and a wound caused by the sin of Adam.
The third view, however, roots same-sex desire in undefined, chance variations within natural processes. Keen draws the following conclusion–which I have summarized in my own words–from the third view: Since the origin of same-sex desire is morally neutral, the desire itself is morally neutral, and if the desire is morally neutral, acting on the desire must also be morally neutral.
Notice how the force of Keen’s final conclusion depends on her accepting the apparent connection made in the first option between the moral status of the origin of same-sex attraction and its present moral status. She treats the first option as if it claimed to derive its knowledge of the present sinful nature of same-sex attraction exclusively from its acquired knowledge of its sinful origin. This is not true. To the contrary, traditionalists assume—whether they are aware of it or not—that the origin of same-sex attraction must be a sinful act because they already know from biblical moral teaching that same-sex intercourse and the desires that lead to it are sinful. At the risk of repetition let me repeat: the moral character of the hidden origin of a desire is revealed by the manifest moral character of the act arising from the desire—not the other way around.
If I am right about this reversal of order, Keen’s argument will not hold and her conclusion, stated in italics above, does not follow. Contrary to the direction of Keen’s logic, she can know that the origin of same-sex attraction is morally neutral only because she already knows that same-sex attraction is morally neutral on other grounds—not the other way around as her argument leads us to believe. She knows that same-sex attraction cannot be a divine curse following on the sin of Adam because she knows on other grounds that it is not a curse at all. What are these other sources of Keen’s knowledge that same-sex attraction is morally neutral? The answer to this question will have to wait for another day.
All three options beg the question. They assume from the beginning what they ostensibly set out to prove, moving in one giant circle. Contrary to its intentions, this chapter teaches us that speculation about origin of a characteristic cannot help us determine its present moral status. Such fallacious reasoning vitiates all three options and is correctly labeled the “genetic fallacy.”
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*Note: As a matter of fairness and honesty, I ask you not to take my restatement and interpretation of Keen’s thought as identical to her own. I’ve tried to be fair, but if you want to represent her views to others please read her book for yourself or explain that you read about her views in my essays. Also, Keen made two replies to my essays in which she points out what she considers to be misrepresentations of her views in my review. You can find her replies among the “replies” to part seven, “In the Dark All Cats are Black.”
In this essay I will continue my review of Karen Keen, Scripture, Ethics, and the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships by examining chapter six: “The Question of Celibacy for Gay and Lesbian People.” The first sentence of the chapter states well the question that drives the chapter. “Does the difficulty of life-long celibacy provide biblical grounds for considering same-sex relationships morally acceptable?” Keen answers yes. How does she arrive at this conclusion? Does she make a compelling case?
The first step in Keen’s argument is to establish that the Bible and evangelical churches make exceptions to moral rules under certain circumstances. In normal circumstances divorce is forbidden, but Paul allows divorce in the case of abandonment (1 Cor 7:15). In this circumstance the option of saving the marriage does not exist. Thoughtful evangelicals, who view abortion as a terrible evil, recognize that in the situation where saving the life of the mother will come at the cost of her unborn child and saving the child will cost the mother’s life, abortion is permissible. You cannot save both, and there is no good option.
Keen now applies the principle derived from the extreme cases discussed above to less extreme cases. In 1 Corinthians 7:1-7, Paul instructs married couples not to use their devotion to God as an excuse to deprive one another of sexual fulfillment. Paul advises unmarried people to remain unmarried, but, if they are unable without great distress to remain celibate in this condition, they are free to marry. According to Keen, Paul thereby makes a compassionate concession to human weakness and need by approving marriage as an alternative to celibacy or promiscuity.
To prepare the reader for her application of Paul’s situational thinking to same-sex relationships, Keen’s first task is to establish a strong analogy between the two types of relationships, heterosexual and homosexual. According to Keen, long pastoral experience and recent psychological studies have demonstrated that being gay and lesbian is not a choice and can very rarely be changed. Moreover, single gays and lesbians who attempt to remain celibate, like single heterosexual people who make this attempt, usually fail. Hence traditional alternatives to forming covenanted same-sex relationships within which sexual fulfillment can be achieved are unrealistic: for most gays and lesbians, marriage to a person of the opposite sex is not a workable option, and changing one’s orientation is nearly impossible. In Keen’s estimation celibacy is “unfeasible,” produces great “suffering,” is “impossible” for most people, and produces “physical and emotional death.” She roots the suffering and unfeasibility of celibacy in divine creation:
“But the reality is that human beings are biologically made for sexual relationships, not life-long celibacy.”
“God created us with a strong familial drive to couple with another person and build a home.”
Keen now closes the loop. Paul understands that most single people cannot without great unhappiness devote themselves to a life of celibacy. As a matter of caution in view of temptation to fornication and compassion in view of the suffering involved in celibacy, he permits them to marry even though he thinks that in the present circumstances it would be better to remain single (1 Cor 7:29-31). Keen argues that Paul’s logic can be applied to gay and lesbian people. Given the divinely created drive to “couple with another person” for companionship and sexual fulfillment, the pain of celibacy, and the lack of alternatives, the Pauline concession to marry can be applied to gay and lesbian people as a “humanitarian” exception to the rule. Keen is not arguing that if Paul were confronted with the predicament of contemporary gay and lesbian people and armed with the new knowledge we possess about sexual orientation, he would come to her conclusion. No one can know what Paul would do. She argues, rather, that if we exercise the same concern for human weakness and compassion for suffering as Paul exercised in First Corinthians 7, we will come to the conclusion she does. We will provide a way out of the “ethical dilemma of the gay person unable to achieve celibacy.”
For the most part, Keen admirably refrains from impugning the character of her traditionalist opponents. However near the end of this chapter, she slips into a plaintive mood. The contemporary church’s lack of sympathy for the plight of its gay and lesbian members, she speculates,
stems from traditionalists’ bias towards concerns more familiar to the majority of church members…their neglect of gay and lesbian people and their plight reflects traditionalists’ grievous disregard of minority church members’ needs—not unlike the early church’s favoritism of Hebrew widows over Hellenistic widows during food distribution (Acts 6:1-4).
In making this accusation, Keen draws a not so subtle analogy between traditionalists’ rejection of same-sex relationships and such irrational and ugly prejudices as racism and sexism. Why does she insert these barbs? Is she “preaching to the choir” of people who already agree with her conclusions? Or, is she appealing to those evangelicals who have already been influenced by progressive culture’s successful categorization of gay and lesbian people as an oppressed minority? (The “nagging question” I mentioned in my previous post.) In any case, it seems out of character with the thrust of the book.
Keen concludes the chapter with an answer to the question with which she opened it:
By extrapolating from Paul’s instruction that people with strong passions should marry, a case can be made for the moral acceptability of same-sex covenanted relationships.
1. If Paul makes exceptions to moral rules in view of human weakness and to prevent the suffering and harm that would be caused by imposing them, we may also make such exceptions under the same or analogous circumstances.
2. Paul makes such exceptions.
3. Hence we may also make such exceptions in the same or analogous circumstances.
4. Contemporary Christian gay and lesbian people find themselves in a predicament the same or analogous to the predicament of those people for whom Paul made exceptions to otherwise binding moral rules.
5. Hence we may also make an exception to the moral rule against same-sex relationships for Christian gay and lesbian people for whom other alternatives are not possible or would cause grievous suffering and harm.
Regarding #1: The first clause of premise one is conditional. The truth of the second clause depends on the truth of the first.
Regarding #2: Number 2 appears to be false. Does Paul really make exceptions to moral rules based on circumstances? In the case of divorce (1 Cor 7), he seems simply to acknowledge that abandonment by the unbelieving partner constitutes a de facto divorce unrelated to a decision made by the believer. With regard to Paul’s advice for single people to marry if they cannot remain celibate, Paul never asserts that celibacy is a moral requirement for anyone. Hence permission to marry is not an exception to a moral rule. If Paul does not in either of these cases make an exception to a moral rule, he sets no precedent and gives no guidance about how to make exceptions to moral rules. At best, he gives us guidance about living wisely within a general moral framework.
Regarding #3: Because #2 (the minor premise) is false, #3 (the conclusion) does not follow and may also be false. Its truth, if it is true, would have to be established on other grounds.
Regarding #4: Because the conditional clause in #1 is false, the minor premise #2 is also false, and #3 does not follow, #4 is to some extent moot. It goes nowhere. However it still deserves comment. If I am correct that Paul did not make exceptions to binding moral rules in 1 Corinthians 7, then #4 contains a false assertion. The two situations are only superficially analogous. Finding yourself abandoned by your spouse is to be a victim not a perpetrator of an immoral act, and for unmarried people to enter into traditional marriage was never against divine law. Keen’s argument serves no purpose unless it presupposes that same-sex intercourse was forbidden. And Paul does not give people permission to engage in forbidden acts.
Regarding #5: As a conclusion to the entire line of reasoning, we cannot say that #5 is false, only that it does not follow. Making a weak or fallacious argument for a thesis does not prove the thesis false. If you believe on other grounds that Keen’s thesis is false, a weak or fallacious argument may confirm your doubt. However, if you believe on other grounds that Keen’s thesis is true, you may overlook her argument’s weaknesses, or you may draw on those “other grounds” to support your belief, or you may attempt to formulate stronger arguments.
Next Time: “Is it Adam’s Fault? Why the Origin of Same-Sex Attraction Matters” (Chapter 7).
Today I will continue my review of Karen Keen, Scripture, Ethics, and the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships.* However before moving on to chapter 6, “The Question of Celibacy for Gay and Lesbian People,” I want to discuss a methodological issue that will become increasingly important as we reach the final phases of Keen’s argument.
Who bears the burden of proof, Keen or the traditionalist? In a court of law in a criminal case, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The prosecutor bears the “burden of proof.” There is no logical law, however, that says the one who affirms a proposition (for example, “the defendant committed the crime,” or “God exists.”) bears a greater burden of proof than one who denies that proposition. For to deny the proposition “God exists” is logically equivalent to affirming the proposition, “God does not exist.” In the same way, there is no logical law that says defendants are more likely to be innocent than to be guilty. The reason prosecutors bear the burden of proof is that in our culture we believe that it is morally preferable to let a guilty person go free than to punish an innocent one. Hence by demanding that the prosecution bear the burden of proof we increase the level of our certainty that justice will be served. Who bears the burden of proof in the discussion in which we are now engaged, the one who affirms the proposition, “Same-sex relationships are morally acceptable” or the one who denies this proposition? Logically speaking, there is no distinction in the level of evidence required to affirm or to deny this proposition. Who bears the burden of proof? is not a logical question at all but a rhetorical one, dependent on the makeup of the audience the speaker wishes to persuade.
Keen’s target audience of bible-believing evangelicals approaches her book with the presumption that the Bible teaches that same-sex intercourse is immoral and that the ecumenical church has held this view for 2,000 years without dissent. Keen acknowledges this rhetorical situation and argues as if she bears the burden of proof, for on the face of it the Bible and tradition stand overwhelmingly against her contention. She has an uphill climb, and it seems that she is clear about that.
Because Keen has willingly accepted the burden of proof and argues accordingly, I do not as a critic need to accept the responsibility of defending the opposing proposition (that is, “same-sex relationships are not morally acceptable”) to fulfill my duty of dealing with Keen’s argument responsibly. All I need to do is rebut her case. If you are an evangelical who holds the traditional view of same-sex relationships and Keen cannot move you to reject or doubt that position, you have no logical, rhetorical, or moral duty to explain why you remain unmoved.
When the audience is comprised of progressives or simply of a cross-section of popular American culture, the rhetorical situation is completely reversed. Within the last decade, beginning in about 2010, a consensus formed in American and other Western cultures that places gay and lesbian relationships on an equal footing with traditional married couples. In 2021, anyone who argues in a public forum for the traditional view of same-sex relationships bears an insurmountable burden of proof. The biblical teaching on same-sex relationships carries no weight at all. Arguments from natural law or physical complementarity or reproductive capacity are met with incredulity, if not derision. Progressive culture has decided that the self-attested experience of gay and lesbian people—also of transgender people—is the highest authority possible for deciding the issue. Anyone who contests this self-authenticating experience or who refuses to draw the correct conclusions from this testimony can do so only from irrational prejudice, hatred, or fear. Within our culture, expressing traditional views on same-sex relationships corresponds to speaking blasphemy in theocratic cultures and engenders the same sort of response. Under these conditions and with this audience, argument is impossible, dissent is forbidden, and silence provokes suspicion.
Before I take up the last three chapters of the book, I need to ask a question to which I will return in my examination of those chapters. Keen presents her arguments as founded on–or at least consistent with–the same view of biblical authority as that held by her evangelical audience, and she seems to accept the burden of proof in relating to that audience. But I wonder how much the plausibility of her argument depends on evangelicals having absorbed to one degree or another the progressive assumption that the self-authenticating experience of gay and lesbian people is the final court of appeal when it comes to the moral acceptability of same-sex relationships. Would Keen’s interpretive strategy and novel treatment of biblical texts possess any plausibility with evangelicals were it not for the influence of progressive culture on them, that is, were they not already disposed to find her arguments plausible?
The social pressure on evangelicals to conform to progressive orthodoxy is powerful, pervasive, and relentless. They face it in their schools and colleges, in the media, in the workplace, and in law. There is no escape, no respite. It takes extraordinary clarity and strength to accept social marginalization as the price of remaining faithful to the Christian vision of life. And Keen offers a simple way out of this difficulty: you can keep your evangelical piety, your Trinitarian orthodoxy, and your doctrine of Scripture while joining progressive/popular culture in celebrating same-sex relationships. I have no doubt that this solution will appeal to many evangelicals, especially to younger generations.
Does Keen consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or instinctively, overtly or subtly appeal to those sensibilities and that desire for a way out? The cultural wind is clearly at Keen’s back. To what extent does she take advantage of it to move her audience toward her position? These questions have been eating at me from the beginning.
*I want to remind the reader again that my choice to review Karen Keen’s book is a matter of convenience. I looked for the right book to serve as a springboard for me to discuss these issues in detail. After examining many others, I decided that Keen’s book would served this purpose very well. My goal is not to chop Keen into little bits. I hope she takes my choice as a complement. There are not many books to which I would devote such thought as I have put into this one.
In the previous six essays I traced Karen Keen’s construction of the principle of biblical interpretation she uses in her argument for the biblical acceptability of loving, covenantal same-sex relationships. Today I will present my critique of Keen’s hermeneutical principle.
According to Keen’s principle of interpretation…
(1) Promoting the universal principles of justice, kindness, and love, and minimizing human suffering is the divine purpose of the Bible’s moral instructions. The well-being of individuals and the community is the point. Our highest loyalty must be given to the divine purpose of promoting justice and love.
(2) When the Bible commands or prohibits specific moral behaviors, these instructions must be viewed as conditional applications of justice and love to specific circumstances. When circumstances change, therefore, the specific applications of those unchanging principles must also change. What the biblical authors thought was just, good, loving, kind, and compassionate in their circumstances we may judge not to be just, good, loving, kind, and compassionate in our circumstances.
(3) Hence we are free and even obligated to exercise our reason to determine whether a biblical command applies to our setting in the same way it applied to its original situation. If applying a rule as written to our setting would cause suffering, injustice, indignity, or any other form of harm, we must reformulate it in a way that avoids these negative consequences.
1. Keen’s interpretive method exemplifies a fallacy studied in every basic logic course: that which proves too much proves nothing. Keen knows that the specific biblical teaching against same-sex intercourse is subject to revision because every biblical teaching on specific behaviors is subject to revision. Only because the general principle covers every case can she presume without argument that it also applies to same-sex relationships. To be true to the divine intent, contends Keen, we must deliberate about how a specific command measures up to the divine purpose of the Bible’s moral teaching. I see two major problems with this conclusion. First, if we can find even one specific command that can also serve as a universal moral principle, she would need to revise her method. She could no longer assume but would need to argue that the general principle, though not applying in every case, applies in the case of same-sex relationships. Second, if Keen’s principle of interpretation applies to every specific biblical moral rule, every one of those rules becomes subject to review and revision in view of our understanding of what is good and just. Adopting Keen’s hermeneutical method, then, would open a Pandora’s Box of other behaviors that could in a stretch be justified by these principles. It would create a night in which all cats are black.
2. Keen’s method conflicts with another truth: a half-truth is still an untruth. Keen is correct that the Bible recognizes the difference between general moral principles and specific cases of their application. She is also correct that the Bible teaches that God gave his commands for our good. Those are easy cases to make. But Keen’s argument makes a much stronger claim. For the argument to work, (a) she must demonstrate that only general principles, never specific commands, are universally binding. She does not demonstrate this; instead she lets us jump to this conclusion. Moreover, (b) Keen’s argument depends not only on the biblical teaching that God’s commands are for our good but on our ability to know in what ways they are good for us and how God’s general moral principles may be applied today in ways that produce outcomes that are good for us. She leaves out of consideration the possibility that God’s specific commands are good for us in ways that we cannot presently grasp.
3. Does the Bible really support Keen’s view of interpretation? Every reader of the Bible knows that there is great emphasis in the Bible on trust and obedience to divine commands even when we do not perceive their wisdom. Even when obedience produces suffering and death! The Bible praises unquestioning obedience as a virtuous quality and it never approves of questioning the wisdom and goodness of the law (Psalm 119). Were Adam and Eve correct to question God’s command not to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil? The fruit looked good to them, and what’s wrong with knowledge (Gen 2:17)? The angel of the Lord communicated God’s approval of Abraham’s faith and obedience to the divine command to sacrifice his son Isaac (Gen 22:1-19). Or, listen to words from Deuteronomy 4:
“Hear now, O Israel, the decrees and laws I am about to teach you. Follow them so that you may live…Observe them carefully, for this will show your wisdom and understanding to the nations….So be careful to do what the Lord your God has commanded you; do not turn aside to the right or to the left. Walk in all the way that the Lord your God has commanded you” (Deut. 4:1-32).
On what grounds may we assume that we have the wisdom and perspective to judge every biblical rule by our understanding of what is good and loving? Keen fails to make the case that her proposed method of interpretation expresses the Bible’s view of specific commands.
4. General principles alone cannot guide us in specific situations. How do the principles of justice, peace, mercy, and love, apart from specific commands and a tradition of examples, doctrine, and narratives, give us concrete guidance in particular situations? What is just? How do I love my neighbor? What are compassion and mercy? Every observer of modern culture knows that many of our contemporaries, having cut themselves loose from the biblical tradition, use these words as empty vessels into which to pour their own wishes, desires, and preferences. Consider how the word “love” is used today. Do you love someone when you affirm their desires and feelings, when you care only for their subjective sense of well-being? Or, does loving someone mean to will and seek the best for them? From where, then, do we learn what is good, better, and best for human beings…in the short term, medium term, and eternally? Taking up the Christian life involves learning the true nature of love, justice, mercy, compassion, and all other virtues from the Bible’s commands, narratives, doctrines, and examples. We cannot do this if we claim the right to sit in judgment over every specific command in view of empty general principles.
5. I am not convinced that Keen has sufficiently differentiated her interpretative principle from the liberal progressive principle of interpretation, something she has obligated herself to do by claiming to be an evangelical writing for evangelicals. Simply to say, as Keen does, that evangelicals hold these universal principles binding because God commanded them does not differentiate Keen’s approach from progressive/liberal theology. Liberal theologians make the same affirmation. Liberals might be more radical than Keen in their application of this hermeneutical principle but their principles are identical. In their radicalism, liberals can claim with some justification that they are being more consistent than Keen is with her starting point.
6. Keen fails to consider how much “love” needs to be enlightened by knowledge. Consider again the following assertion, which I quoted in a previous post:
“When the virtue of selfless love fills a person’s heart, all actions that flow from that are pure and are pleasing to God.”
After thinking about this statement, I happened to read Philippians 1:9-11, which says,
9 And this is my prayer: that your love may abound more and more in knowledge and depth of insight, 10 so that you may be able to discern what is best and may be pure and blameless for the day of Christ, 11 filled with the fruit of righteousness that comes through Jesus Christ—to the glory and praise of God.
Notice that love must be informed about what is best. Thus informed, it can produce lives that are “pure and blameless.” Good motives are not enough. For it is possible to do bad things for the best of motives, and it is possible to do good things for the worst of motives. Paul urges us, instead, to do the best things for the best of motives. Desire to do good things must be enlightened by knowledge of what is truly good.
In these criticisms, I have not attempted to demonstrate that Keen’s interpretative principle is altogether false. I readily admit that it contains elements of truth, which accounts for its power to persuade some people. Nor do I offer an alternative hermeneutic strategy to explain the Bible’s moral teaching. As a minimum result, the six criticisms above show that Keen has not demonstrated that her method of interpretation will bear the weight she places on it. Specifically, she has not shown that the distinction between universal and contextual, or virtue and deed, or general purpose and contextual application, or principle and embodiment applies to every specific biblical command in a way that justifies revising and restating it in view of its supposed underlying divine purpose. Therefore, she has not yet demonstrated that her hermeneutic method applies to the biblical prohibition of same-sex intercourse. She will have to make this case independently. Does she succeed? I will address this question in my review of the final three chapters of the book.
Next Time: A review of chapter 6, “The Question of Celibacy for Gay and Lesbian People.”
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