Tag Archives: gender theory

Biology and The Nature of the Sexes

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I write this post to recommend a new book recently published by my colleague and friend Tomas Bogardus: The Nature of the Sexes: Why Biology Matters (Routledge, pp. 156). Bogardus has been publishing for the past six years in the areas of the philosophy of sex and gender. In an era when expression of feelings, language manipulation and political rhetoric dominate public discussion of sex and gender, Bogardus calls us back to biological reality and rational rigor.

Overview

In Chapter 1, “Introduction,” Bogardus explains the significance of the debate and whets our appetite for the book’s argument. In Chapter 2, “What the Sexes Could Not Be,” he surveys four unacceptable proposals for specifying the differences between the sexes. All four views take sex to be “complex” in a variety of ways: (1) the word “sex” is an ambiguous term, (2) the meaning of sex depends on the research context, (3) the word “sex” is indeterminate and can apply to a range of things, (4) according to the “property-cluster hypothesis,” there is no one property necessary to the definition of sex. Bogardus examines and rejects each of these views.

In Chapter 3, “What the Sexes Could Be: The Gamete View,” Bogardus builds up to his understanding of the defining characteristics of the sexes. (Just so we are clear, a gamete is a reproductive cell, sperm or egg, that when united form a zygote.) The gamete view in general, defines males as organisms capable of producing sperm and females as organisms capable of producing eggs. Bogardus surveys three views within the umbrella of “the Gamete View” and finds weaknesses and strengths in each one. Combining the strengths of the surveyed views, Bogardus defines the sexes this way:

Put simply, a male is an organism with the function of producing sperm, and a female is an organism with the function of producing eggs. Put more carefully, the sexes are particular kinds of functions—activated higher order functions—of entire organisms, coded in master programs specifying the development, organization, and maintenance of components themselves programed to produce (and transport, etc.) some type of anisogamous gamete, for example, sperm or ova (p. 68).

Chapter 4, “Gender is Defined in Terms of the Sexes,” argues that “gender” should be defined in terms of biological sex. Gender talk cannot be disengaged from reference to biological sex or it becomes meaningless. Bogardus explains why: “To understand what gender identity is, one must understand what a gender is, and to understand that, one must understand the sexes” (p. 104). To say, “I am a woman trapped in the body of a man” uses the word “woman” in a confused way. It fuses typical “feminine modes of presentation of women” with the female sex. Although simultaneous hermaphroditism is a reality in simpler organisms, humans are never both male and female in the biological sense of “activated higher order functions” capable of producing both sperm and ova. Bogardus recommends avoiding the word “gender” altogether and using such “sex-based alternatives” (p. 104) as “biological sex,” “norms of the sexes,” ‘roles of the sexes,” “adult sexes,” “juvenile sexes;” or one can continue to speak about man and woman, boys and girls.

Chapter 5, “When Biology Meets Politics,” addresses the thorny issues circling around the politicization of sex and gender. Bogardus argues that we should defer to biologists in the matter of defining sex, and he refutes those who wish to enforce linguistic norms designed to engineer a new understanding of sex that better conforms to the political aspirations of certain groups. As an example, suppose we attempt to enforce the rule that “a person is male only if he identifies as male.” The circularity of such expressions is glaringly obvious. How can maleness be something that exists only because of an act of identification unless maleness is something objective one can identify as? Apart from reference to biological reality, how could we know what the expressions “is male” and “as male” mean?

In Chapter 6, Bogardus defends using pronouns that track with biological sex. Among other reasons for this contention, Bogardus points out that in our social relations there are good reasons to know the sex of the person we are speaking with. Compelling examples include finding a mate and keeping female spaces safe from predators, who overwhelmingly tend to be males.

Recommendation

The Nature of the Sexes cuts through the linguistic fog and political posturing that plague public and academic discussions of sex and gender. It calls us back to common sense and biological reality. In contrast to talking heads on cable news and ideologues in academia, Bogardus sounds like the voice of reason itself. I learned something new on every page! I recommend this book highly!

Bogardus Podcasts

If you listen to podcasts, you may enjoy these three presentations by Bogardus. Very informative and entertaining:

Here’s a talk from September summarizing the main arguments of the book: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KI6g5iuRL14

Here’s a recording of a lecture Bogardus gave at the University of Maine a couple years ago, with a Q&A from students: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KGYI4sWhAfI

Here’s a popular level debate Bogardus did a few years ago with a popular left-wing Youtube influencer who goes by the name ‘Vaush’: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NHxHSD4qWEM

“Dignitas Infinita” (Infinite Dignity): A Recommendation

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Today I would like to recommend reading the full text of the just released declaration of the Roman Catholic Church’s Dicastery [from a Greek word meaning congregation or assembly] for the Doctrine of the Faith on “Dignitas Infinita” (Human Dignity). Popular media focuses on paragraphs 48-50 on Surrogacy and 55-60 on Gender Theory and Sex Change, ignoring the Declaration’s treatment of the theological foundations for these and other practical applications. But this narrowing of focus to “hot button” issues is unfortunate, because the Declaration’s sections on contemporary issues are incomprehensible and unpersuasive apart from its theological sections.

Every sentence, indeed almost every word, of the Declaration is rich with theological meaning and historical associations. A full commentary would run hundreds of pages. In this post, I will make only a few observations designed to whet your appetite to read it for yourself. The Declaration is a beautiful example of theological reasoning and courageous application. In an age of confusion and irrationality, I welcome its clarity and rationality. In a time wherein Scripture and tradition have been replaced in many hearts by subjective experience, I appreciate its submission to these normative authorities. The Declaration is relatively short, containing 17 pages of text divided into 66 paragraphs followed by 7 pages of footnotes. It is divided into 7 sections under the following headings:

Presentation

Introduction

1. A Growing Awareness of the Centrality of Human Dignity

2. The Church Proclaims, Promotes, and Guarantees Human Dignity

3. Dignity, the Foundation of Human Rights and Duties

4. Some Grave Violations of Human Dignity

Conclusion

In what follows I will highlight the main thrust and some significant points from each of the seven sections.

Presentation

In the Presentation, Víctor Manuel Cardinal Fernández, Prefect of the Dicastery for the Doctrine of Faith, tells the story of the Declaration on “Infinite Dignity” from its beginnings in 2019 to its approval by Pope Francis on March 25, 2024.

Introduction

The Introduction clarifies the concept of infinite human dignity. Human dignity is “infinite” in the sense that at no point between conception and death and under no circumstances in between may a limit be placed on the worth of a human being. The first paragraph of the Introduction is worth quoting in full:

Every human person possesses an infinite dignity, inalienably grounded in his or her very being, which prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter. This principle, which is fully recognizable even by reason alone, underlies the primacy of the human person and the protection of human rights. In the light of Revelation, the Church resolutely reiterates and confirms the ontological dignity of the human person, created in the image and likeness of God and redeemed in Jesus Christ. From this truth, the Church draws the reasons for her commitment to the weak and those less endowed with power, always insisting on “the primacy of the human person and the defense of his or her dignity beyond every circumstance” [Francis, Apostolic Exhortation Laudate Deum (4 October 2023)].

In a subsection (“A Fundamental Clarification”), the Declaration attempts to clarify the confusion in contemporary thinking surrounding the phrase “the dignity of the human person.” For the word “person” is often used in a way that excludes the objective and ontological reality of human beings and focuses only on the individual’s capacity for self-determination. Consequently, “Dignitas Infinita” distinguishes among four aspects of the concept of dignity: ontological dignity, moral dignity, social dignity, and existential dignity. Whereas “ontological dignity” is objective, essential and inalienable, moral, social, and existential dignity vary with circumstances. We have a duty as individuals and societies to promote the moral, social, and existential dignity of all people in view of their ontological dignity.

1. A Growing Awareness of the Centrality of Human Dignity

Like every good treatise in theology, “Dignitas Infinita” places its doctrinal conclusions in historical context. Whereas classical antiquity made some progress toward the concept of human dignity, only with the biblical doctrine of creation—especially its declaration that God created human beings in God’s image—the teaching, death and resurrection of Jesus, the apostolic message of salvation in Christ and the hope of eternal life does the fullness of infinite human dignity come to light. The document continues with a brief look at Thomas Aquinas, who building on the work of Boethius defined “person” as “what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature” (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 3). This section also touches briefly on developments in the Renaissance, in the Enlightenment thought of Descartes and Kant, and in twentieth-century Personalism. It quotes approvingly the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which speaks of “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” The section on the historical development of the concept of human dignity ends with the Second Vatican Council, which urged acknowledgment of the “sublime dignity of the human person, who stands above all things and whose rights and duties are universal and inviolable.” According to “Dignitas Infinita,” during the course of the history of the concept of human dignity,

The Church’s Magisterium progressively developed an ever-greater understanding of the meaning of human dignity, along with its demands and consequences, until it arrived at the recognition that the dignity of every human being prevails beyond all circumstances.

To be continued…