Monthly Archives: June 2023

At the Edge of Ruin

I have been engaged in a decades-long quest to understand the philosophical assumptions that have driven Western culture, especially in the United States of America, to the brink of moral anarchy and metaphysical nihilism. I have read shelves of books in service of this quest. For the past six months I have been reading J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1998) . There are very few books I think worth careful reading even once, and I could count the number of books worth reading twice on my fingers and toes. Schneewind’s book is among the latter. I read it very carefully in the spring and I am over halfway through my second reading at present.

In 554 dense pages, Schneewind analyses the thought of hundreds of thinkers. It would be foolish of me to attempt to map the bewildering variety of theories. Nevertheless, I’d like to share a few things I’ve learned from reading this history about those contemporary assumptions driving us to ruin.

The Quest of Modern Moral Philosophy

Schneewind marks the beginning of the distinctly modern approach to morality with the career of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and ends the story with Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Before modernity, moral theology and philosophy were not distinguished to the point of becoming separate spheres of knowledge and distinct academic disciplines. Until around 1600 the dominant approach to morality was obedience to authority. In the century and a half between Grotius and Kant the disciplines split apart and the dominant approach shifted progressively from obedience to authority (that is, to God, state, and church) to self-governance, and finally to autonomy (self-legislation).

What prompted the development of a distinctively modern moral philosophy? To oversimplify but not falsify matters, the Protestant Reformation (1517 and following) provoked a crisis of faith, gave birth to philosophical skepticism, and disrupted the moral and political order in Europe. Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) articulated this new skepticism in a sophisticated and fashionable way. In a collection of essays, he advised his generation on how to live well in a culture where everything is doubtful. In response to the religious conflict and the skepticism this struggle provoked, Grotius and those who followed in his wake worked to articulate a moral philosophy that could be agreed upon by people who differed greatly in religion. This objective energized a line of thinkers that lead from Grotius to Hobbes to Locke to Kant.

The Great Debate

According to Schneewind, the moral philosophers working on this project fall into many conflicting and overlapping schools of thought. But almost all of them fall on one side or another of the great debate between voluntarism and intellectualism, which has roots in late medieval philosophy. Voluntarism argues that the distinctly moral nature of an action is grounded in (and only in) the command of a superior. Obligations and duties, the distinctions between right and wrong and justice and injustice are created by (and only by) the commands of a superior. The motives for obeying the laws thus promulgated are fear of punishment and desire for reward. Voluntarism can take shape in theological or secular forms. Theological voluntarists (William of Ockham) argue that God and human beings do not share a common moral world. Right actions are right because God commands them, not because they conform to God’s moral nature. Secular voluntarists (Hobbes) argue that what is obligatory is determined by the legislation of the state. There is no law before or above the state.

 Intellectualism argues that the distinctly moral nature of an action is rooted in the eternal nature of a moral universe shared by God and other rational creatures. The distinctions between right and wrong and justice and injustice are unchangeably present in the eternal nature of things. Obligations and duties arise from the inner necessity of reason to conform to truth. We are rightly motivated to moral action by the impetus of reason to conform to the rational order. For some intellectualists God plays an essential role in their philosophy. Leibniz (1646-1716), for example, understands God as the most perfect being and views moral action (divine and human) as seeking under the guidance of reason to increase perfection in the world. Loving God is the most rational act possible for a human being. Secular leaning intellectualists set aside the question of God and ground moral action in the autonomous moral order.

Mutually Assured Destruction

Voluntarists criticize intellectualists for subordinating God to a moral order that exists independent of the divine will and choice. God’s power and freedom, voluntarists charge, are limited if God and all rational beings share an eternal moral universe. Additionally, if human beings share a moral universe with God, they can know the divine mind simply by reflecting on their own minds. And this theoretical overlap between the divine mind and the human mind opens the possibility of deification of the human mind, making God irrelevant to morality, and grounding the right in the human essence.

On the other hand, the intellectualists criticize voluntarists because they apparently make the divine nature and will inscrutable and arbitrary. As far as we can know, the voluntarist God is beyond good and evil as we understand them. God is pure power and must be obeyed for that reason alone. Additionally, a state based on the voluntarist philosophy would be by definition tyrannical.

There were many thinkers in this 150-year history that attempted to avoid the extremes of both voluntarism and intellectualism by weaving into their systems elements of both. Immanuel Kant’s concept of autonomy can be considered an attempt of this kind. Autonomy is the idea that rational beings legislate laws for themselves not by an act of will but by an act of reason, which they are obligated to obey.

What Failure Teaches

Early modern moral philosophers were searching for a rational theory of morality that could overcome doubt about the reality of a moral order in an age when traditional authorities no longer commanded universal respect. They wished to reestablish the consensus of culture that had been destroyed by the Reformation and the religious wars that followed. Their failure to find compelling grounding for morality and the exposure of the limits and problems of both voluntarism and intellectualism raised the real possibility that morality has no grounding at all.

I find it significant that no philosopher discussed in Schneewind’s history attempted to create a new morality or rejected all moral rules. All accepted the necessity of the rules that make for social peace and cooperation as well as many other traditional moral rules. Philosophers in this era, instead of taking traditional moral rules for granted or accepting them on authority, felt compelled to establish the grounds of their truth, discover how we know them, and pinpoint what motives should compel us to live according to them. They understood themselves as apologists for a moral order they thought necessary for the continuance of civilization.

However, by acknowledging that traditional rules cannot (rationally) and should not (morally) be accepted on authority or taken for granted as traditional and by failing in their quest to establish morality by reason alone, they unwittingly opened theoretical space for the idea that there are no moral structures that transcend and define the limits of individual actions.

At the Edge of Ruin

In the 225 years since Immanuel Kant, hundreds of other moral philosophers worked on the Grotius-to-Kant project. The also failed. Twentieth-century existentialism (Jean Paul Sartre and Simon de Beauvoir) and a variety of post-modern theories are premised on the failure of the project. If morality cannot be grounded and justified by traditional authority or universal reason, and if intellectualism and voluntarism destroy each other, the only ground left for justifying anything like morality is within the inner world of the unique individual. In analogy to intellectualism, the individual’s inner world replaces the universal moral order and in analogy to voluntarism, the individual’s desires replace the will of God or the laws legislated by the state. The particular desires, feelings, sense of self, wishes, and aspirations of the individual guide that individual in their external behavior. Authenticity—that is the fit between external behavior and internal desire—replaces conformity to authority- or reason-based rules.

In view of the general skepticism in Western society toward a traditional or rational moral order, we are taught in schools and in the media, not respect for moral law and rational order, but respect for the inscrutable and arbitrary inner world of the individual. What is not acknowledged is that apart from integration into the external moral and rational order, the inner world of the individual is chaotic, irrational, and self-contradictory. Hence to affirm the inner world of the individual as the basis of the moral order is to embrace the ruinous nightmare so feared by the early modern moral philosophers. Not only are the rules necessary for social peace and cooperation left ungrounded, it becomes thinkable that an individual may justifiably refuse to live by them if they do not fit harmoniously with their inner world.

At the edge of ruin…that is where we live today.

Interpreting the Bible the “Humble” Way? A Book Review

This morning I read Karen R. Keen’s new book, The Word of a Humble God: The Origins, Inspiration, and Interpretation of Scripture (Eerdmans, 2022). Readers of this blog may remember that in September and October 2021 I wrote an extended review and response to her earlier book, Scripture, Ethics & the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships (Eerdmans, 2018). In that earlier book, Keen argued that properly interpreted Scripture allows for acceptance of covenanted, loving same-sex marriages. Her book made a six-part argument. Central to this argument was her view of biblical interpretation:

  • The Bible’s positive moral teachings provide a vision of justice, goodness, and peace, and they are intended to promote a just, good, and flourishing world.
  • The Bible’s moral prohibitions and limitations are intended to forbid things that cause harm to human beings, human community, and the rest of creation and to prevent heartache and destruction from disrupting human flourishing.
  • To interpret and apply the Bible’s positive and negative moral teachings in keeping with their intended purposes, we must deliberate about whether or not applying a specific biblical rule to a particular situation prevents harm and promotes justice, goodness, and human flourishing. Interpretations and applications that harm and inhibit human flourishing must be rejected.
  • Gay and lesbian people do not choose to be gay or lesbian, and the overwhelming majority cannot change their orientation.
  • A large majority of gay and lesbian people do not have the gift of celibacy and find such a state lonely and deeply painful.
  • Therefore:
  • Because loving, committed same-sex relationships embody justice, goodness, and human flourishing, do not cause harm to the people in the relationship or the human community, and unwanted celibacy causes great harm and unhappiness to gay and lesbian people, faithful deliberation and application must conclude that the Bible allows and even blesses covenanted same-sex relationships.

Reading the biblical texts that condemn same-sex activity in view of these rules of biblical interpretation, Keen concludes that we should not apply these texts to covenanted, loving same-sex relationships. To do so would not promote justice, goodness, and peace but would cause harm and heartache and disrupt human flourishing. These texts condemn only exploitative same-sex relationships.

In a brief email exchange with Keen in 2021, I learned that her new book The Word of a Humble God was forthcoming. I expected that this book would explain and defend the interpretative method she used in her 2018 book. And in a sense my expectation was confirmed, but her argument moves in a long, roundabout way and never actually mentions same-sex relationships. In what follows, I do not provide a full review of the book. My goal, rather, is to isolate and examine what I take to be its essential point.

The book is divided into three parts, The Making of the Bible, Inspiration, and Interpretation. Part One contains four chapters and tells the story of the composition of the Bible in the way one might hear it in a introductory course in a progressive or liberal seminary. The Bible must be understood within its Ancient Near Eastern religious, cultural, and literary context (Chapter 1). It is not the work of one author but the result of community experience and a cooperative effort of reflection, oral tradition, writing, and editing (Chapter 2). The Bible was “not produced in one setting…Scripture developed over time, with later scribes updating and adding their contributions to it” (p. 58). The Bible contains many voices that reflect different contexts and perspectives (Chapter 3). Even the “final” form of the Bible was fixed in a process of assessment and decision, and different branches of Christianity (Orthodox, Ethiopic, Roman Catholic, and Protestant) do not agree on the exact extent of canonical Scripture (Chapter 4).

Part Two deals with inspiration. In three chapters, Keen explains her view of inspiration and differentiates it from other views. She first distinguishes between revelation and inspiration. Revelation “is God’s eternally active presence disclosing the divine Self in various ways” (p. 85).  Inspiration “is how that revelatory communication occurred” (p. 85; Emphasis original). Keen lists six views of inspiration, the last of which is her own. She labels her view the “Divine-Humility View.” She states it as follows:

The Bible is the product of God’s humility in sharing power with human beings. It reflects God-given human agency in collaboration with the Creator (p. 86).

The humble God “inspires” the Bible by “collaborating” (p. 99) with humans and working in a hidden way through their experiences to produce the history that culminated in the Bible.

I read and reread this chapter and I still do not know what Keen means by “inspiration,” how she knows that God inspired the Bible, or even why she needs the word “inspiration” to name the mysterious process to which she refers. In Keen’s theory, God’s working seems so hidden that one could never distinguish a product of divine inspiration from a purely human work. And God’s working seems so universal that it becomes difficult to explain how the Bible differs from other modes of divine communication: nature, other religions, philosophy, or inner illumination.

In Part Three, building on her previous chapters, Keen takes up the subject of interpretation. Interpreting the Bible in view of the divine humility involved in its production requires us to come to the text with humility. God hides in the humanity, diversity, and tensions within Scripture. Only as we approach Scripture with humility can we discern God’s word and will. Humility is the gateway to the meaning of Scripture:

The hermeneutical key, then, is the humility of God and our imitation of it. God shares power and serves us. To know God is to do the same. If the Bible reading does not result in using our agency to elevate and serve others, we aren’t doing it right. Any approach to interpretation can be used for selfish ambition; the right reading is the one that embodies humility (p. 173, Emphasis added).

In her 2018 book Scripture, Ethics & the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships, Keen set forth some hermeneutical rules, which I quoted above. We should, she argues, interpret Scripture in view of its divine intention, that is, God’s desire to promote justice, goodness, and human flourishing. We should never interpret Scripture in a way that causes harm, heartache, and destruction. In this book (The Word of a Humble God), she attempts to show that even the mode in which God inspired the Bible models humble love and a servant heart, and it shows that this humble love is what God wants from us. Hence the purpose of Scripture is to model and evoke humble love. Humility is the interpretive key to Scripture.

Although in The Word of a Humble God Keen does not apply her hermeneutics of humility to the question of same-sex relationships, the kinship to the hermeneutics developed in Scripture, Ethics & the Possibility of Same-Sex Relationships is obvious. All that is missing is the argument that the traditional reading of Scripture as condemning all forms of same-sex sexual relationships does not embody humble love. An interpreter formed in humble love would not read the Bible in a way that causes unhappiness, loneliness, and shame to gay and lesbian people.

I do not object in principle to the hermeneutics of humble love. The Bible clearly teaches that disciples of Jesus should be both humble and loving. Scripture should not be used as an instrument of torture. However, I object to Keen’s implication that any interpretation of Scripture that causes unhappiness and shame in someone is for that reason alone wrong. This principle is too broad to be of any practical help. In many cases helping people to recognize and repent of their wrong and destructive behaviors–even if it causes them to be sad or angry–can be an act of profound humility and deep love. The question, then, turns not only on whether an interpretation causes someone to be unhappy but on whether the condemned behavior is wrong.

The LGBTQ+ Question: Debated or Debatable?

“In the beginning was the Word…and the Word became flesh and lived among us.” (Jo 1:1-14). This Word could communicate the truth about God because “the Word was God.” God’s Word is truth by nature because it is God by nature. In contrast, our words are not by nature God and hence not by nature truth. We are subject to error. At best, words communicate accurately the fallible thoughts of the human mind from which they come. I say “at best” because the process of choosing the right words to communicate our thoughts is also fallible. Often, we are not clear on what we think, and even if we possessed inner clarity of thought, experience teaches us that words cannot perfectly reproduce our thoughts in the minds of others. Not only so, others hear our words through the filters of their own vocabularies and experiences.

Given these challenges many thinkers have observed that open-ended, personal conversation is the best way for two minds to achieve mutual understanding. The back and forth, trial and error, proposal, correction, and counterproposal method of dialogue gradually creates mutual understanding. Writing, podcasts, public speaking involve one-way communication. They are highly subject to misunderstanding, distortion, and caricature. Ideally, we would engage in conversation with everyone we wish to understand. Because the ideal is unachievable, we have to learn to read and listen carefully, analytically, and critically to one-way communications.

An author whose book I read recently drew an inference I think is unwarranted. They based that inference on the verbal similarity between two words. This author observed, quite correctly, that over the last 10 years traditionally evangelical publishers—Eerdmans, Zondervan, and Intervarsity—have started publishing books on both sides of the debate about the Christian acceptability of LGBTQ+ identities and ways of living. So, the subject is debated among self-identified evangelicals. But the author inferred from the fact that the moral status of people who identify as LGBTQ+ is debated that the subject is now debatable within Bible-believing, evangelical churches.

I do not think this inference is warranted. To say that an issue is debated is to make a statement of fact apart from any judgment about its status in relation to Christian doctrine. To say that a subject is debatable is to make a claim about its legitimacy as a viewpoint that may be held under the umbrella of Christian faith. For sure, to label a matter debatable takes no position as to which side is correct. But it envisions a state in which churches must tolerate and listen to both parties in the dispute with an open mind.

Within the history of the church many issues have been designated debatable, disputable, or indifferent matters on which believers may disagree without breaking fellowship (See Romans 14 and 15; Acts 15). But which matters were debatable was itself debated! This debate (about which matters were debatable, disputable, or indifferent) turned on the distinction between matters that were essential beliefs, scruples, and practices and those that were in some way adjunct. In the end, however, the church had to make judgments, come to consensus issue by issue, and enforce those decisions as community standards.

With regard to the debate over the Christian acceptability of LGBTQ+ identities and ways of living, it will take more evidence than the mere existence of a debate to prove that it is now a debatable matter within Bible-believing churches. This change from a settled to a debatable question would overturn a consensus that is unanimous in the Bible and the universal church until recently. The mere presence of a few authors that dispute that consensus does not warrant breaking with that settled teaching. They would need to convince the church that it has misread the Bible and held to a false, cruel, and destructive teaching for 2,000 years.

In my view, the claim that the issue of LGBTQ+ acceptance is a debatable issue because it is now openly debated within evangelical circles is a rhetorical ploy designed to grant legitimacy and gain a hearing for a viewpoint that has not earned that legitimacy the hard way. Hence the debate today is not only about the Christian acceptability of LGBTQ+ identities and ways of living, it is a debate about this issue’s debatability. And the “debatability” of an issue cannot be decided by a few authors’ assertions but is a judgment that only the church can make. In the meantime, the church—given the prima facia teaching of Scripture and the 2,000-year consensus—has every right (and in my view is obligated) to debate with this new teaching as it does with other error and heresy.